The process of state-building was a defining characteristic of later medieval European history and rightly holds a prominent place in both general and region-specific studies of the period.¹ The history of the Iberian peninsula is certainly no exception to this rule, but unlike other regions of the medieval West the process of state-building in Iberia is closely associated with another, more localised, historical and historiographical phenomenon: the Reconquista. As Angus MacKay pointed out in 1977, for many scholars 'the related concepts of the frontier and the reconquest provide the key to Spanish historical development';² more recently, and with reference to the kingdom of Portugal, Stephen Lay has argued that 'the successful prosecution of the reconquest appears to have been intricately interconnected with a process of national formation'.³ In this context, and given the over-arching thematic and chronological scope of the present volume, an examination of eleventh- and twelfth-century perspectives on the process of state-building in the Iberian peninsula suggests itself as a worthy topic for investigation. However, this paper is not so much concerned with the practicalities of state-building - the institutions and mechanisms that were developed for the administration of Iberian frontier societies, and so forth⁴ - as it is with the ideological frameworks and narrative strategies that were used by those who sought to justify their expansionist activities; in other words, it offers an examination of some of the language and ideas by which various groups and individuals attempted to legitimise their state-building endeavours in the period c.1050-c.1150. As will be demonstrated, for many contemporaries the process of Christian state-building in Iberia was rarely associated with the extension of political and military authority over virgin territory; rather, it was more often defined by the reclamation and reconstitution of lands that were believed to have been lost to external aggressors in generations past.⁵ In this way, state-building in the Iberian peninsula in the later Middle Ages was inextricably linked with the successful prosecution of what was understood to be a process of territorial reconquest, and thus might be
characterised - at least in ideological, if not practical, terms - as a process by which Iberian states were being 'rebuilt'.

Ideas of reconquest and 'state-rebuilding' were not, of course, an invention of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The notion of reconquering Iberia from its Muslim occupants, and restoring the Visigothic kingdom that had held sway over the peninsula for around two hundred years before the Muslim invasion of 711, was probably articulated clearly for the first time by peninsular Christians in the late ninth century in the northern territories that would later form León and Castile. For example, in a text known as the Crónica Albeldense, which dates from c.881 and which originated from the court of the Asturian king Alfonso III (866-910), it was recalled how the Muslims had conquered 'the kingdom of the Goths' (regnum Gotorum) in the early eighth century and established a permanent Islamic presence in the peninsula. In response to this invasion, the Crónica recorded that 'the Christians engage them [the Muslims] in battle by day and by night, and they will clash with them daily until divine predestination decrees that they be cruelly expelled from here'. Similarly, in the Chronicle of Alfonso III, which dates from around the same time, it was remembered how 'a short time ago, all of Spain was organised and united under the rule of the Goths', and therefore hoped that through triumphant acts of reconquest 'Spain will be saved and the army of the Gothic people restored'. From these and comparable statements in other texts, scholars such as Ramón Menéndez Pidal have claimed that, once formulated, ideas of peninsular reconquest and Visigothic state-rebuilding became defining concerns for Iberian rulers throughout the Middle Ages. In a famous passage of his book The Spaniards in their History, Menéndez Pidal argued that unlike other regions of the Mediterranean world that had been conquered by Muslim armies in the seventh and eighth centuries, the Christian rulers of the Iberian peninsula had responded to the challenge of the Islamic occupation by formulating a coherent ideological programme of Reconquista. As he put it, 'What gave Spain her exceptional strength of collective resistance ... was her policy of fusing into one single ideal the recovery of the Gothic states for the fatherland and the redemption of the enslaved churches for the glory of Christianity.'

Scholarship has inevitably moved on from the time that Menéndez Pidal was writing, and more recently historians have expressed scepticism about the extent to which ideas of peninsular reconquest might have consistently animated the actions of medieval Iberia's Christian rulers and warrior aristocracy. A consequence of this revisionism has been a growing dissatisfaction with the traditionalist historiography of the Reconquista, as presented in surveys such as Derek Lomax's The Reconquest of Spain, which remains the best-known treatment of the subject in English and which argued that the Reconquest (with a definite article and a capital 'R') had an ideological coherency to it for a period of more than six hundred years. Thus, in his study of Christian-Muslim interaction
in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Catalonia published in 2004, for example, Brian Cados distanced himself from the traditionalist approach to the subject by referring to the Christian advance as "the Reconquest", and arguing that 'ideals of Reconquista ... can hardly be interpreted as causes or determinants of events, certainly not on any grand scale and normally not when they came into conflict with the ambitions of those individuals who were their purported champions'. Instead, for Cados such ideals were referred to by contemporaries as a way of 'justifying actions in certain situations, while answering a need to express a sense of identity and purpose'. Similarly, in their history of the culture of medieval Castile published in 2008, Jerri Lynn Dodds, María Rosa Menocal and Abigail Krasner Balbale suggested that 'eleventh-century Castilians would certainly flirt with the language of Christian destiny, but the idea of reconquest comes from a later century and from another place'. Yet for all the nuances that are evident in the first chapter of his Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain, in 2003 Joseph O'Callaghan still arrived at the following definition:

The reconquest can best be understood as an ongoing process, which, though often interrupted by truces, remained the ultimate goal toward which Christian rulers directed their efforts over several centuries. Claiming descent from the Visigoths, they argued that they had a right, indeed an obligation, to recover the lands of the Visigothic kingdom; once Christian, those lands were now believed to be held unjustly by the Muslims. The traditionalist teleology of the Reconquista is not without its merits. The unitary Visigothic kingdom - effectively defunct after the death of King Roderic and the loss of its capital city of Toledo in 712 - had given way to the Islamic state of al-Andalus and a series of Christian successor kingdoms and counties to the north of the peninsula that gradually extend their authority southwards over hundreds of years, and in 1492 Ferdinand and Isabella did make pains to stress their 'neo-Gothic' credentials as they successfully completed the conquest of Granada and asserted their control over Spain. But in spite of the evidence from the court of King Alfonso III cited above, it does not necessarily follow that the ideas of the Reyes Católicos were shared by all of their predecessors; and it would only be in this context that their Reconquista could be lent a genuine ideological lineage that could be traced back through the medieval centuries. So to what extent did ideas about Iberia’s Visigothic geography and history resonate with peninsular Christian rulers in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the period with which this paper is concerned? And, indeed, how were these historical and geographical frameworks viewed by those from outside Iberia who either promoted or contributed to military action against peninsular Islam? It is important that these questions are asked of these years in particular because it is
generally recognised that the period c.1050-c.1150 saw a dramatic reconfiguration of Christian attitudes towards the Muslims of al-Andalus; as Richard Fletcher stressed in 1987, it was at this time that ideas of reconquest, which appear to have lain dormant since the ninth century, were ‘rediscovered’ once again.

This paper does not promise to offer definitive answers to the questions raised: rather, by sampling a selection of contemporary source material, it seeks to demonstrate that there were in fact a diverse range of attitudes towards, and ideological justifications for, territorial reconquest and state-building (or ‘rebuilding’) in eleventh- and twelfth-century Iberia. As a result, it will suggest that traditionalist approaches to the Reconquista - insofar as they might be defined by an exclusive focus on attempts to liberate the full length and breadth of the peninsula with a view to rebuilding the Visigothic state that had been destroyed in the early eighth century - are in need of modification. Ultimately, this paper seeks to test the conclusion reached by Menéndez Pidal (and which was to some extent echoed by O’Callaghan) that ‘the proposal to recover all the soil of the [Visigothic] fatherland ... never ceased to appeal to the mass of the people’ in eleventh- and twelfth-century Iberia.

It might seem curious to begin the analysis by looking beyond the Iberian peninsula and focusing on the state-rebuilding ideas of the eleventh-century reform papacy, but Damian Smith has argued convincingly that the papal reformers played an important role in stimulating ideas of peninsular reconquest from c.1070 onwards as they encouraged the ‘liberation’ of churches and enslaved Christians from the perceived tyranny of Islam, both in Iberia and in the eastern Mediterranean. As Smith has put it, ‘the language of the Reconquista is the language of the Reformed Papacy and is more fully expressed in the letters of popes, particularly from Gregory VII to Paschal II, than in any other sources’.

There is certainly a good deal of evidence to support this claim. In April 1063, for example, Pope Alexander II (1062-73) reported with delight that a Catalan town had been liberated ‘from the power of the pagans’, and in the following year he declared that it was legitimate ‘to fight against those [Muslims] who persecute Christians and drive them from their own homes’. But there is some distance between these ideas and notions of peninsular reconquest as traditionally formulated. Indeed, if the letters of Pope Urban II (1088-99) are anything to go by, although the reform papacy may have been keen to liberate occupied territories in Iberia to restore metropolitan sees, some individuals were at times more measured in their aims. As is well known, much of Pope Urban’s attention was focused on the city of Tarragona, which is located approximately 120 kilometres south of Barcelona and which had been one of the administrative centres of the peninsula in the Visigothic period. In July 1089 Pope Urban wrote the first of several requests to Berenguer Ramón II of Barcelona (1076-97), in which he asked the count to concentrate his military efforts on liberating the city and called for ‘the restoration of the church of Tarragona, so that, with God’s
help, an episcopal seat might be established there in safety, and so that the same city might be filled with Christian people to stand as a wall and an outer defence (in murum et antemurale) against the opposition of the Saracens’.

It is difficult to know exactly what Urban II’s aims were here. His proposal that Tarragona might act as ‘a wall and an outer defence’ suggests that he was looking to create a kind of buffer state between Islamic Spain and the rest of western Christendom, but if this was the case it would seem to represent a short-term strategic aim rather than a longer-term visionary goal. In any case, Urban’s appeal achieved little and the reconquest and resettlement of Tarragona was to prove problematic for a number of years to come. Nevertheless, Urban’s focus on Tarragona seems to have been quite pragmatic in contrast to the peninsular ambitions of one of his predecessors, Pope Gregory VII (1073–85).

At the beginning of his pontificate Gregory had given his authorisation to a military campaign that was to be fought against the Muslims of Iberia under French leadership. However, there were strings attached, because Gregory made it clear in a letter of 30 April 1073 that those who fought in the peninsula were effectively working to reconquer and restore lands that were claimed by the papacy. As he spelled out to his correspondents:

We do not believe it to be unknown to you that from ancient times the kingdom of Spain has belonged to the personal right of St Peter and that to this day, although it has for long been occupied by the pagans, the law of righteousness has not been annulled: it therefore rightfully belongs to no mortal man but only to the apostolic see.

Gregory was certainly willing to concede local territorial jurisdiction to the conquerors, but he maintained his right to an overriding control over the peninsula: he was, in effect, advocating the creation of papal fiefs that would be ruled over by papal vassals, be they Spanish or French. Although the result of these proclamations in 1073 was negligible, Gregory repeated his claims to peninsular overlordship four years later in a letter that was sent to ‘the kings, counts and other princes of Spain’, and which, in Simon Barton’s words, displayed ‘a cavalier disregard for either peninsular realities or local sensibilities’.

By ancient statutes the kingdom of Spain has been handed in law and in proprietorship to blessed Peter and the holy Roman Church. To be sure, both the misfortunes of past times and a certain negligence of our predecessors have hitherto obscured this. For after this kingdom was overrun by Saracens and pagans and the service that used to be rendered thence to blessed Peter was withheld on account of their infidelity and tyranny and for so many years diverted from the use of ourselves, the very memory of these things and of proprietorship began alike to fade.
Now, because the victory that divine clemency has granted to you over these enemies, and which should always be granted, has handed over the land into your hands, we would not have you any longer to ignore this matter.\footnote{62}

Needless to say, there has been some debate over the meaning of the ‘ancient statutes’ to which Gregory was referring here, and it seems most likely that he was invoking the terms of the Donation of Constantine, by which the western provinces of the Roman Empire were supposed to have been transferred to papal control in the fourth century.\footnote{63} But, regardless of its historical (or pseudo-historical) basis, there can be no doubt that in this letter Gregory was advocating a manifesto for a full peninsular reconquest and an affirmation of Petrine rights over all liberated territories by requiring the payment of tribute. This was undoubtedly a model of Iberian state-rebuilding, but it would not appear to sit easily with the Visigothic historical framework that is often portrayed as being so crucial to the secular rulers of the peninsula. In this respect, the evident tension between papal and neo-Gothic ideas of reconquest that arises from Gregory’s letters corresponds with observations recently made by John France in a \textit{festschrift} presented to Malcolm Barber. According to France, ‘the papacy of the eleventh century had a wide view of the world and a remarkable grasp of history which differentiated its outlook sharply from that of the generality of the European elites.’\footnote{64} France was writing here about the differences between papal and secular knowledge of Byzantium in the period c.850-1099, but his comments about the papacy’s broader historical memory seem to be just as applicable to contemporary ideological disconnects about the nature of, and justifications for, Iberian reconquest.

A peninsular response to Gregory VII’s proclamation that can be identified almost immediately came from the chancery of Alfonso VI, the king of León-Castile (1065/72-1109). From the winter of 1077 onwards Alfonso was styled in charters and letters as \textit{imperator totius Hispanie}, ‘emperor of all Spain’, in what has been seen as a direct refutation of Pope Gregory’s bold claims over Iberia.\footnote{65} What did Alfonso understand by this designation? A near-contemporary perspective on Alfonso’s imperial title is to be found within a text known as the \textit{Historia Silense}, an anonymous work almost certainly written by a Leonese monk in the decade after Alfonso’s death, which set out to offer a glorious account of the king’s reign.\footnote{66} Within the \textit{Silense}’s lines Alfonso is described variously as the ‘orthodox emperor of Spain’\footnote{67} and ‘our emperor’,\footnote{68} but, perhaps most tellingly, the text also stresses that he was ‘descended from the illustrious stock of the Goths’\footnote{69} and thus entitled to claim dominion over the whole peninsula.\footnote{70} The \textit{Silense} sought to substantiate Alfonso’s claim to peninsular hegemony by ‘weaving [his] genealogy’\footnote{71} and ‘uncovering the origin’ of his kingdom, tracing the king’s direct connections with the Visigothic and Asturian monarchies of the early medieval period.\footnote{72} Having done this, the \textit{Historia} then returned to more contemporary
concerns and promised to enumerate how 'the provinces of the kingdom of the Spaniards were reclaimed from sacrilegious hands and restored to the faith of Christ'.

The picture painted by the *Historia Silense* is a reasonably clear one and is among the most conventional depictions of reconquest ideology that survives from this period; as is made plain, Alfonso’s ‘imperial’ task was well and truly focused on rebuilding a unitary neo-Gothic state. But it is hard to assess how far these ideas influenced his actions and decisions, as well as those of his predecessors and successors; for all the talk of re-establishing the ‘empire of Toledo’ the kings of León and Castile were still bound by the traditions of partible inheritance, for example. Nevertheless, the testimony of the *Historia Silense* with regard to Alfonso’s aims and ideals is corroborated by a contemporary Muslim writer, ‘Abd Allah, who had been ruler of the *taifa* state of Granada from 1073 to 1090 before he was exiled to Morocco, from where he wrote his memoirs. In one section of his recollections that was supposedly informed by his direct contact with one of Alfonso VI’s ambassadors, Count Sisnando Davidiz, ‘Abd Allah recorded that: ‘Al-Andalus originally belonged to the Christians. Then they were defeated by the Arabs and driven to the most inhospitable region, Galicia. Now that they are strong and capable, the Christians desire to recover what they have lost by force.’

Alfonso took significant steps to realising his imperial pretensions when, in 1085, he succeeded in bringing about the conquest of the former Visigothic capital of Toledo. Although it is unclear to what extent he had targeted the city’s recovery out of a specific desire to fulfil notions of reconquest, and to what extent these ideas were applied to his actions retrospectively, it is evident that the city’s recovery came to be imbued with a monumental significance. In a charter dated to 10 December 1086, for example, Alfonso stated explicitly that he had been driven by memories of the Visigothic past:

This city [of Toledo] had been held in the possession of the Moors for 376 years... In the place where our holy fathers adored the God of faith intently, the name of the accursed Muhammad was invoked... And so, after God gave me imperial authority, I engaged in war with the barbarian peoples... And in this way, inspired by the grace of God, I moved my army against the city in which my most powerful and opulent ancestors had once reigned, reckoning that it would be pleasing in the sight of the Lord if I, Alfonso the emperor, with Christ’s guidance, was able to return to his followers what the faithless people (under the evil direction of Muhammad) had snatched away from them...  

As far as the neo-Gothic state-rebuilding ambitions of Alfonso VI go, then, so far, so conventional. But the waters are muddied a little when one turns to look
at the reign of Alfonso VI's grandson, Alfonso VII, who ruled from 1126 to 1157, and who assumed the imperial title in 1135 in what has been described as an 'act of bravado'. Many contemporary writers seem to have been in agreement that Alfonso's authority stretched beyond the territories of León-Castile; in 1147, for example, Pope Eugenius III referred to Alfonso as 'the king of the Spaniards', and the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir later repeatedly described Alfonso as 'Little Sultan', using designations such as 'king of Toledo and its regions' and, intriguingly, 'king of the Franks in al-Andalus' to denote the nature of his rule. One might also approach some understanding of what the emperor himself thought through studying the words of Marcabru, the Gascon troubadour who was active in the court of Alfonso VII from the 1130s onwards. In the winter of 1137-8, for example, Marcabru composed a poem in which he wrote that, as emperor, Alfonso VII's royal 'prowess was increasing', and in which he exhorted his patron to take the fight to the Muslims of al-Andalus and North Africa (referred to here as 'Pharoah's descendants'): 'You should indeed carry the burden for the good of Spain and the Holy Sepulchre, [and] push the Saracens back, lay low their lofty pride and then God will be with you at the end.' But perhaps most importantly, Marcabru made it clear that it was only with Alfonso's leadership over the peninsula's other rulers that any military actions could be prosecuted effectively: 'With Portugal's valour, and that of the Navarrese king as well, if only Barcelona turns towards imperial Toledo, we will be able to holler "Reia!" and defeat the pagans.'

Much of our knowledge about Alfonso's career comes from a text known as the Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris, which was probably written before 1150. The organisation of the Chronica is striking: it consists of two books dealing with Alfonso's reign, the first of which treats the period from his accession up to the year 1135 and is primarily focused on what might best be described as domestic politics; and the second, which follows on from his assumption of the imperial title and focuses on his military dealings with the Muslims of al-Andalus. It is not easy to say whether or not peninsular reconquest was an integral part of living the imperial dream for Alfonso, but what is remarkable about the content of the Chronica is how few connections are drawn between his reign and those of his Visigothic ancestors. In fact, the evidence from the Poem of Almería, an incomplete verse account of Alfonso's 1147 siege of the Muslim-held port city that was appended to the Chronica, would suggest that Alfonso was understood to have been tapping into a slightly different tradition of peninsular reconquest from that of his grandfather.

The Poem opens by describing the mustering of Alfonso's forces before the siege of Almería began in earnest. Alfonso himself is described as follows:

The leader of them all was the king of the empire of Toledo. This man, Alfonso, who holds the title of emperor, was following the deeds
of Charlemagne, with whom he is rightly compared. They were equal in courage and in strength of arms, and equal was the glory of the achievements of their wars."

It would be stretching things to say that there is no hint of the Visigothic here; Alfonso is, after all, described as 'the king of the empire of Toledo'. But a greater emphasis seems to be placed both here and elsewhere in the Poem on situating Alfonso's deeds within a pseudo-historical Carolingian context. It is impossible to know for sure which model of the 'deeds of Charlemagne' the author of the Poem had in mind when he wrote these lines, but it seems a strong possibility that the author - probably Arnaldo, bishop of Astorga - was drawing on ideas contained within a contemporaneous text known as the Historia Turpini.

The Historia Turpini, as it survives in its earliest Latin form, probably originated from Santiago de Compostela in c.1140. It is bound within a codex known as the Liber sancti Jacobi, which constitutes a collection of texts designed to codify the institutional identity of the cult of St James the Great, and it purports to be a first-hand account by Archbishop Turpin of Rheims of how the Emperor Charlemagne had 'liberated Spain and Galicia from the control of the Saracens' in the late eighth century. I have argued elsewhere that the Historia ought to be regarded as a kind of foundation legend for Iberian crusading that drew on traditions of Carolingian myth and the growing popularity of pilgrimage to Compostela, but it is noteworthy that the text also contains some rather unusual ideas about peninsular reconquest and state-rebuilding that deserve more attention than they have received to date.

The Historia begins with a description by 'Pseudo-Turpin' of how the Emperor Charlemagne was recruited to fight for the reconquest of Iberia by St James the Great, whose relics were venerated at Santiago de Compostela in the peninsula's north-west corner. The apostle is reported to have appeared to Charlemagne in a dream, at which point he made the following proclamation:

> My body now lies buried unrecognised in Galicia, which at the present time is still oppressed by the Saracens. I am astonished that you, who have conquered so many lands and cities, have not liberated my land from the Saracens. Therefore I give you notice that because the Lord has made you more powerful than any of the other kings of the world, he has chosen you from among all others to prepare my way and to deliver my country from the hands of the Moabites, so that you may earn for yourself a crown of everlasting reward.

From the outset, then, Charlemagne was being called upon to fight in Iberia for the recovery of the terra sancti Jacobi and the liberation of the pilgrim road to
Compostela - a war of reconquest that was to be defined and justified by a desire for a religious rather than a political supremacy.

The Historia then proceeds to record how Charlemagne immediately set off to fight in Iberia, and indicates how it was not long before the entire peninsula was brought under his control: 'the whole of the land of Spain - that is to say, al-Andalus, Portugal, the lands of the Saracens and Pardi, Castile, the land of the Moors, Navarre, Álava, Vizcaya, Vasconia and Pallars - all gave way to Charlemagne's rule.' A subsequent chapter goes on to give precise details of the places that Charlemagne is supposed to have conquered. Particular clusters of place-names suggest areas that were deemed to have been of importance; there is, for example, a considerable concentration of sites in the Ebro valley (including Zaragoza), and in the central and south-eastern areas of the peninsula (including Almería); as noteworthy are the references to Charlemagne's conquests ranging to include the Balearic Islands and across into North Africa. It is difficult to know how far this register of place-names should be taken as evidence for the writer's serious geographical understanding; did he actually know where any of these places were? Although it is possible that place-names were being listed in such great number in an attempt to communicate simply the scale of Charlemagne's achievements, it seems likely that Pseudo-Turpin's vision of Charlemagne's peninsular activities was influenced by contemporary military events, such as the short-lived conquest of the Balearic Islands by the count of Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer III (1097-1131), in 1113-15, the conquest of Zaragoza by Alfonso I of Aragón (1104-34) in 1118, or the same king's subsequent campaigns in the Ebro valley in the 1120s. Equally, the locations of victories in North Africa might reflect much broader contemporary military ambitions, such as the idea of opening an alternative route to the Holy Sepulchre through al-Andalus and across the Maghreb.

However these place-names might be interpreted, there can be no doubt that what Charlemagne was doing in Iberia was being presented in the Historia as an exercise in territorial reconquest rather than anything more aggressive or opportunistic; this was, after all, 'the land of St James' that had fallen into the clutches of Islam. But the Historia also makes it clear that, for Charlemagne, there was a broader dynastic imperative at work, and that his endeavours should be understood to have been part of a process of Frankish, rather than Visigothic, state-rebuilding: 'Some of these cities had been conquered by other French kings and German emperors before Charlemagne's time and had afterwards reverted to pagan rites,' Pseudo-Turpin wrote, before citing the names of various Merovingian and Carolingian rulers, 'but Charlemagne subjugated the whole of Spain during his lifetime'.

The narrative of the Historia Turpini continues to show how Charlemagne's initial successes in the peninsula were challenged by subsequent waves of Muslim invaders, who more often than not crossed into the peninsula
from North Africa and destabilised the Carolingian settlement. In one later chapter Charlemagne’s territorial claims over the peninsula are set out much more deliberately, as he returns to Iberia once again to recover lost lands. Prior to his final showdown with the Muslim leader Aigolandus, Charlemagne exchanges words with his opponent as they face each other across the pilgrim road to Compostela. The dialogue that Pseudo-Turpin invented for the stand-off is worthy of quotation in full; one wonders how far it might reflect some of the sorts of debates that twelfth-century proponents of reconquest engaged in as they sought to formulate justifications for military action against the Muslims of al-Andalus (who could of course be seen to have established their own claims to political jurisdiction over the peninsula). Although nominally set in the eighth century, Pseudo-Turpin is here surely ventriloquising an imagined twelfth-century conversation between Iberian Christians and the Muslims of al-Andalus:

Then Charlemagne said to Aigolandus: ‘So you are the Aigolandus who has fraudulently stolen my land away from me! I acquired the land of Spain and Gascony through the invincible power of the arm of God, subjugated it to the laws of Christianity, and forced all of its kings to recognise my imperial authority. Then, when I returned to France, you seized the Christians of God, devastated my cities and castles, and ravaged the whole land by fire and with sword....’ Then Aigolandus said to Charlemagne: ‘I implore you to tell me why you stole from our people land that you did not hold by hereditary right, since it was not possessed by your father, or your grandfather, or your grandfather’s father, or your grandfather’s grandfather.’ ‘That is as may be,’ said Charlemagne, ‘but our Lord Jesus Christ, creator of heaven and earth, chose our people - that is to say, the Christian people - before all other peoples, and he appointed us to have lordship over all the other peoples of the whole world.’

This pan-global vision of Christian religious supremacy as a justification for expansionism and, by extension, Christian state-building, is far broader than anything associated with the dynastic claims of, say, Alfonso VI (although one wonders whether Gregory VII might have had some sympathy with the sentiments that the Historia expressed). Indeed, the description that the Historia offers of the post-conquest territorial organisation that Charlemagne set in train in Iberia is a remarkable account of the construction of a truly cosmopolitan ‘crusader state’:

When these deeds were done, Charlemagne divided the lands and the provinces of Spain among those of his warriors and peoples who wished to settle in that country. He gave Navarre and the Basque country to the Bretons, Castile to the Franks, Nájera and Zaragoza to
the Greeks and Apulians who were in our army, Aragón to the Poitevins, the part of al-Andalus that was next to the coast to the Germans, and Portugal to the Flemish and the Danes.... After this there was no-one who would dare to wage war against Charlemagne in Spain."

This geo-political situation would of course have been completely unrecognisable to peninsular Christians in the mid-twelfth century, and the Historia's ultimate purpose was unquestionably to stimulate western European arms-bearers to follow Charlemagne's example by engaging the latest wave of Muslim invaders from North Africa in combat and to encourage them to rebuild Christian authority over the peninsula; this was the overt message of the forged crusade encyclical that was appended to Pseudo-Turpin's work. Furthermore, the international character of this imagined eighth-century reconquest might also be regarded as a twelfth-century attempt to establish a precedent for the contemporary 'Europeanisation' of Iberia and, in particular, to provide a pseudo-historical context for the military contribution, and subsequent settlement, of those who originated from beyond the peninsula. The vision of peninsular reconquest contained within the Historia Turpini, which may have influenced the author of the Poem of Almeria and perhaps even the imperial outlook of Alfonso VII himself, would therefore seem to give the lie to the idea that the Visigothic past was firmly entrenched in the collective memory of Leonese-Castilian elites, or that it might have superseded other quasi-mythological versions of the peninsula's history, however fanciful they might appear to modern historians.

But what of the other Iberian kingdoms? There is not space here to discuss contemporary Portuguese, Navarrese, Aragonese or Catalan ideas of state-building (or rebuilding), although it is worth noting that sources relating to Portugal and Catalonia in particular have very different stories to tell; indeed, it is hardly surprising that the rulers of these realms had far less invested in restoring the unitary Visigothic kingdom than their counterparts in León-Castile did. What is more, this paper has concentrated exclusively on Christian ideas of state-building, and it should be noted that any holistic study of the subject would benefit from incorporating an analysis of Muslim ideas. What historical models (if any) did the Almoravids or the Almohads look to when constructing their twelfth-century empires in al-Andalus? Were they at all interested in re-establishing the caliphate of Córdoba, which had collapsed so spectacularly by 1031? Given that Arabic writers were certainly aware of Christian ideas of reconquest and claims to peninsular overlordship, as the testimony of 'Abd Allah quoted above indicates, might there in fact have been some interface between Christian and Muslim ideas of peninsular hegemony?

Nevertheless, what we appear to be left with on the Christian side is not, as has often been supposed, a coherent or homogenous vision of reconquest that
united secular and ecclesiastical elites from across the peninsula and beyond. Instead, it would seem that there was a range of competing and overlapping visions of state-building (or 'rebuilding'), from the reform papacy's ideas of peninsular liberation and ecclesiastical restoration, through the traditionalist neo-Gothic ambitions of some of the rulers of León-Castile, to the more extravagant Carolingian claims of the author of the *Historia Turpini*. As is suggested by Alfonso VI's imperial response to Gregory VII's claims to peninsular overlordship in the 1070s, or the allusion to Charlemagne's eighth-century campaigns in the opening lines of the *Poem of Almería* in c.1150, these various ideas undoubtedly inspired and fed off each other, as well as off contemporary military achievements and setbacks, such as Alfonso VI's conquest of Toledo in 1085 and the Almoravid invasion that he inadvertently provoked. The traditionalist construction of the *Reconquista*, with its emphasis on the recovery of lost territory as a precursor to the reconstruction of a unitary neo-Gothic state, seems too restrictive a narrative to impose upon the history of state-building ideologies in medieval Iberia. To the extent that there was a process of territorial reconquest and state-rebuilding in Iberia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it is clear that it was fuelled by ideas that were highly susceptible to change over both time and space.

Notes


12 See esp. the discussion in Fernández-Armesto, *passim*.

13 Lomax, p. 2 and *passim*, argued that it was ‘illogical’ to regard the Reconquest as ‘merely a modern historiographical concept superimposed on a series of disconnected events’. See also, for example, González-Jiménez, p. 49, who wrote that ‘the Reconquest ... [was] a projected ideal which was never abandoned during the Middle Ages’.


15 Ibid., p. 85.


17 O’Callaghan, *Conquest*, pp. 20-1. But see also ibid., pp. 3-4, where it is noted that ‘Like all ideas ... the reconquest was not a static concept brought to perfection in the ninth century, but rather one that evolved and was shaped by the influences of successive generations’, and p. 20, where it is stated that ‘[not] everyone involved in it was motivated in precisely the same way’.


O’Callaghan, Reconquest, pp. 27–9. Gregory may well have been looking to the precedent set during the pontificate of Alexander II by King Sancho I Ramirez of Navarre (1063–94), for which see ibid., p. 27.


La documentación, no. 13, p. 24. Translation from Cowdrey, Register, p. 244.


Historia Silese, ed. J. Pérez de Urbel and A. González Ruiz-Zorrilla (Madrid, 1959). For a more detailed consideration of this important text, see R. Fletcher, ‘A Twelfth-Century View of

Ibid., pp. 7, 214. For a discussion of the Visigothic legacy, see now Hillgarth, passim.


Key themes that distinguish reconquest ideology are, I suggest, liberating, retaking, reclaiming and restoring (as opposed to conquering, expanding, extending or amplifying), and an explicit awareness of a territorial propriety that has been usurped by an external aggressor.

Fletcher, ‘Reconquest’, passim.

Menéndez-Pidal, p. 188.


O’Callaghan, Reconquest, pp. 27–9. Gregory may well have been looking to the precedent set during the pontificate of Alexander II by King Sancho I Ramirez of Navarre (1063–94), for which see ibid., p. 27.


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*Historia Silense*, pp. 118-19, 141.

Ibid., p. 177.

Ibid., p. 119.

See also ibid., p. 176, where the inhabitants of tenth-century León are referred to as the gens Gotorum. It is noteworthy that the author of the *Silense* had access to the *Chronicle of Alfonso III*, one of the foundational ‘reconquest texts’ of the late ninth century referred to above: see Fletcher, ‘View’, p. 154.

*Historia Silense*, p. 141.

Ibid., p. 125.

Ibid., p. 119.

See, for example, the discussion of the events that took place after the death of King Fernando I in 1065 in ibid., pp. 119-20, 204-5. O’Callaghan, *Reconquest*, pp. 4-5, points to thirteenth-century complaints about how this custom hampered eleventh-century attempts to reconstruct Visigothic hegemony.


O’Callaghan, *Reconquest*, p. 41.


*The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period, Part 2: The Age of Nur al-Din and Saladin*, trans. D.S. Richards (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 36-7, 91. References to Alfonso VII as ‘Little Sultan’ were presumably intended to be condescending and point to an understanding that Alfonso thought more of his imperial authority than his Muslim adversaries did.


For the date, see *Marcabru*, no. 22, p. 309.

*Marcabru*, no. 22, pp. 310-11. It is tempting to think that this is an oblique reference to Alfonso VII’s interest in opening the *iter per Hispaniam*, an alternative route to the Holy Sepulchre via Spain and North Africa. Marcabru’s song can be dated reasonably closely in time to Alfonso’s confirmation of the privileges of the confraternity of Belchite (1136), which, although short-lived, was an organisation that was founded for the express purpose of opening the *iter*. For the context, see Purkis, *Crusading*, pp. 129-37; P.J. O’Banion, ‘What has Iberia to do with Jerusalem? Crusade and the Spanish Route to the Holy Land in the Twelfth Century*, *Journal of Medieval History* 34 (2008), 383-95.


‘Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris’, in *Chronica Hispana saeculi XII*, ed. E. Falque, J. Gil and A. Maya, CCCM 71 (Turnhout, 1990), pp. 147-248. For a recent discussion of this text, see S. Barton, ‘Islam and the West: A View from Twelfth-Century León’, in *Cross, Crescent and
See the comments of Fletcher, ‘Reconquest’, pp. 41–2. Barton, ‘Islam’, pp. 171–4, shows that Alfonso was not incapable of pragmatism in his dealings with peninsular Muslim rulers, but the terms of the treaty of Tudellen (January 1151) certainly indicate how ambitious his plans for future conquests were: see O’Callaghan, Reconquest, p. 47.


‘Prefatio de Almaria’, in Chronica Hispaina saeculi XII, p. 255.

See also ibid., p. 262, where the military prowess of the ancestors one of Alfonso’s senior nobles is said to have surpassed that of Roland and Oliver.

Barton and Fletcher, pp. 155–61.


HT, p. 199.


For the medieval cult of St James and the development of pilgrimage to Compostela, see R. Fletcher, St James’s Catapult: The Life and Times of Diego Gelmitrez of Santiago de Compostela (Oxford, 1984), pp. 53–101.

HT, p. 201.

HT, p. 202. See also The Song of Roland, trans. G. Burgess (London, 1990), p. 29, whose opening lines state that Charlemagne had ‘conquered that proud land as far as the sea’. It is possible that the reference to the tellus Pardi was intended to point to the territory in the frontier region south of the Duero: see Barton and Fletcher, p. 244 n. 197. My thanks to Professor Barton for this suggestion.


Smith, pp. 35–6, notes that Lisbon is not included in this list and argues that the absence of a reference to the city suggests that the text was completed before its conquest by King Afonso I Henriques (1128–85) in 1147, for which see now J.P. Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom (New Haven and London, 2007), pp. 136–67. D.S. Bachrach, ‘Conforming with the Rhetorical Tradition of Plausibility: Clerical Representation of Battlefield Orations against Muslims, 1080–1170’, International History Review 26 (2004): 1–19 (3), notes that ‘When addressing audiences familiar either with the events written about or with similar situations, the chroniclers tried to sound accurate, even if their accounts differ in detail from the events they describe.’

See O’Callaghan, Reconquest, pp. 35–6.

Pseudo-Turpin's interest in the extension of reconquest activities to North Africa was not unique, however, and contemporaries were certainly aware that the Visigoths had held authority over the African province of Mauritania Tingitana. See, for example, the description of the extent of Visigothic dominion in the Historia Silense, p. 118: 'The Spanish kings governed in a Catholic manner from the Rhône, the greatest river of the Gauls, as far as the sea which divides Europe from Africa; six provinces, that is to say, of Narbonne, Tarragona, Betica, Lusitania, Carthago and Galicia. Furthermore they subjected the province of Tingitana, in the furthest bounds of Africa, to their lordship.' Translation from Barton and Fletcher, p. 28.


For the text of this forged encyclical, see HT pp. 228-9. For analysis, see Purkis, Crusading, pp. 160-2.

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"Smith, p. 39 n. 12, suggests the possibility of a textual relationship between the *Historia Turpini* and the *Chronica Adefonsi imperatoris* (the chronicle to which the *Poem of Almeria* was appended).

Stuckey, p. 142, has written that ‘Charlemagne [is] cast as the perfection of Christian kingship and imperial authority’ in the HT. It is at least a possibility that Alfonso’s targeting of Almeria – a city on the south-eastern coast of the peninsula – was something of an attempt to justify his claims to imperial (neo-Carolingian?) authority over Iberia. In targeting Almeria in 1147 – as Charlemagne was supposed to have done before him – Alfonso could legitimately claim to be reconquering (in the words of *The Song of Roland*, p. 29) ‘that proud land as far as the sea’. The economic advantages of the campaign should not be discounted, however; see B. Gari, ‘Why Almeria? An Islamic Port in the Compass of Genoa’, *Journal of Medieval History* 18 (1992): 211–33.


See esp. Fernández-Armesto, *passim*.

See also the conclusions of McCluskey, pp. 223–5. For an important study of the evolution of ideas of reconquest in the later Middle Ages, see J.F. O’Callaghan, ‘Castile, Portugal, and the Canary Islands: Claims and Counterclaims, 1344–1479’, *Viator* 24 (1993), 287–308.