Confusion of a strangely willed kind surrounds the events of 26 January 2011, an occasion whose - metaphorical - fogginess will yield footnotes for years to come in the scholarship of British constitutional theorists. This was the day on which Gerry Adams, the Sinn Féin President and MP for West Belfast, who wished to stand as a candidate for Louth in the upcoming Irish elections to the Dáil, resigned as an MP from Westminster; or, at least, thought he had. For, of course, British constitutional procedure does not permit an MP to resign. Rather the exit from Westminster is a circuitous one; a Member cannot simply evade his or her responsibilities and resign, but has to take an office of profit under the crown - most famously, of course, the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds - which automatically disqualifies him or her from the Commons. In the event, the Prime Minister David Cameron announced - with a hint of schoolboy sniggering - that Gerry Adams had accepted just such a post, another quasi-Ruritanian sinecure, namely that of Steward and Bailiff of the Manor of Northstead. The Sinn Féin President was indignant, and denied that any thing of the sort had happened: ‘I simply resigned….I am an Irish Republican. I have had no truck with these antiquated and quite bizarre
aspects of the British parliamentary system.’\(^1\) Whether one takes the view that the Prime Minister accurately parsed the legal fiction involved, or whether Adams was strictly correct in his blunt assessment of what had happened, one thing is clear: the Sinn Féin President’s Irish nationalism was rooted in an uncompromising republicanism - as everybody knew, which is precisely why the Prime Minister found it a cause for mirth, and why Adams was decidedly not amused. A close and intimate relationship exists between Irish nationalism and the cause of republicanism. Indeed, in the vocabulary of politics which prevails in these islands, ‘republicanism’ tends to be used interchangeably with ‘Irish nationalism’.

Things are much less straightforward in the case of Scottish nationalism. Republicans abound among the rank-and-file supporters of the Scottish National Party (SNP). A recent survey showed that sixty per cent of Party members sampled thought the monarchy incompatible with a modern democracy, with only twenty per cent in disagreement.\(^2\) Moreover, republican views, while not a priority, are commonplace among the Party elite. Roseanna Cunningham, the Perthshire MSP and Scottish Government minister, who ran against Salmond for the Party leadership in 2004, is widely known as ‘Republican Rose.’ Indeed, the SNP’s leader Alex Salmond - though not a republican now, and possibly lukewarm even then - was briefly expelled from the Party in the early 1980s because of his participation in a


proscribed republican faction, the 79 Group. In spite of the membership’s commitment to republicanism, the SNP under Salmond has come to appropriate the British monarchy as part of its carefully triangulated campaign for a British ‘social union’. A compelling slogan which has proved impervious - unsurprisingly - to unionist criticism, the SNP’s ‘social union’ seems to involve an incongruous marriage of the loose, decentralized arrangements of the seventeenth-century Union of the Crowns with the values of the post-1945 Attlee Welfare State. Moreover, while the SNP is intent on dismantling the United Kingdom, it happily promotes what it calls ‘United Kingdoms’.

The recent history of the SNP’s policy on the monarchy comprises various subtle manoeuvres and adjustments which have drawn the Party away - though not conclusively so - from its basic republican instincts. The current SNP position appears to be that the British monarch will be the head of state in an independent Scotland, unless the people choose otherwise. This position was reached by means of a sleight of hand, or quiet change of emphasis within the terms of what had been understood to be Party policy since 1997. In 1997 the SNP Conference - against the advice of Salmond - decided that there would be a referendum during

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4 The term ‘social union’ is rarely defined, and Professor James Mitchell of Edinburgh University, a leading expert in this field, tells me that he would distinguish an SNP ‘friends and family’ social union from the royal union and from a welfare union, which is more often espoused by the unionist parties. Needless to say, there is considerable confusion in popular opinion about exactly what a ‘social union’ means, and it is likely that those who use the expression and their auditors are not always imagining the same kind of union.

the first term of an independent Scottish Parliament on the question of whether
the Queen should be retained as Head of State.

The SNP’s draft ‘Constitution for a Free Scotland’ of 2002 stated under Article II
that the Queen would be Head of State in an independent Scotland. When
the Queen was not resident in Scotland, the elected Presiding Officer of the Scot-
tish Parliament would act as Head of State. Exploiting the slippage between offi-
cial Party policy and the Constitutional blueprint, in 2011 Salmond quietly dropped
the provision about the referendum to confirm that the Queen would be the Head
of State. The independence white paper Scotland’s Future issued by Scotland’s
SNP Government in November 2013 announced that an independent Scotland would
‘remain within the Union of the Crowns’ - or ‘social union’ - and that the Queen’s
position as head of state would ‘form an intrinsic part of the constitutional plat-
form in place for independence’. The white paper leaves open the possibility that
a future Scottish government might propose to abolish the monarchy, but makes it
clear that the current SNP administration ‘does not support such a change.’

The SNP has also chosen in recent years to channel anti-royalist ire on par-
ticular aspects of the British monarchy which affronted modern sensibilities rather
than on the institution per se. In particular, Salmond’s SNP has directed its atten-
tion on the exclusion of Catholics or the spouses of Catholics from the royal suc-

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cession. Not only was the English Act of Settlement (1701) which excluded Catholics from the throne an integral element of Article II of the Treaty of Union (1707), but the SNP’s critique of this aspect of the British monarchy helped - tactically - to distance the modern SNP from an earlier, and less glorious phase, of the Party’s history. The SNP was formed in 1934 as a fusion of the left of centre National Party of Scotland (recently established in 1928) and the right-wing Scottish Party, formed in 1932 as a nationalist offshoot of Scotland’s Unionist Party. The Scottish Unionists, a fusion of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists who had split from Gladstonian Liberalism in opposition to Irish Home Rule, had a strongly Protestant identity and a markedly Orange hostility to Irish Catholic immigration. These traits were transmitted to the Scottish Party and onwards to the early SNP. Anti-Catholic sentiments flourished in the SNP in the inter-War years and survived into the post-War era. In 1950 Andrew Dewar Gibb, a former Unionist, who had been the Party leader from 1936-40 and had held the Regius Professorship of Law at Glasgow University since 1934, complained that, ‘The Union gave Scotland her Irish problem.’ Salmond was determined to decontaminate the brand, not least


in order to woo Scotland’s large Labour-voting Roman Catholic constituency, which was both suspicious of the SNP and, more generally, offended by some of the historic remnants of late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century anti-Catholicism which still lurked in the British constitution. Cleverly, Salmond argued that the nationalist objection to the Union of 1707 lay not only in the Union’s incorporation of the Parliaments, but also in the Union’s confirmation and consolidation of the anti-Catholic provisions of the Act of Settlement. For instance, the main thrust of the SNP’s response to the quatercentenary of the Union of the Crowns in 2003 was to focus not on the crown itself, but on the Protestant straitjacket imposed upon it by the Act of Settlement. In the independence white paper of November 2013, the SNP Government declared its intention to introduce a measure post-independence - in concert with other Commonwealth countries where the Queen was head of state - ‘to remove religious discrimination from the succession rules.’

Is the function of the monarchy in SNP ideology merely to provide cautious tactical camouflage on the long march - via some form of similarly undefined Union of the Crowns-like ‘devo-max’ - to full independence? Or is there, perhaps, some deeper inhibition in the Scottish nationalist tradition which prevents the wholehearted expression of a republican nationalism? After all, for the first half century or so after the Union of 1707 which joined England and Scotland in a single state, it was the cause of the exiled Stuart monarchs - the Jacobites - which provided the main vehicle for anti-unionist sentiments in Scotland. Does Jacobitism - or, to be more exact, the historical memory of Jacobitism - play a long-term role

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14 Scotland’s Future, pp. 22, 354.
in shaping the curious ambivalence felt by Scottish nationalists on the topic of monarchy?

Peering back further into Scottish history, we are confronted with a further ambivalence in the momentous events of the late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century War of Independence. Medieval Scotland’s resistance to England was led first by a commoner, William Wallace, one of the Guardians of the realm, then by King Robert the Bruce. Yet, the celebrated letter of the Scottish barons to the Pope in 1320, today known as the Declaration of Arbroath, also appeared to locate Scottish sovereignty not in the person of the monarch, but in the wider community of the realm; something that seems akin to popular sovereignty. The legacy of the medieval War of Independence continues to shape modern Scottish political thought, and the SNP’s Independence referendum was scheduled for 2014, the seven hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn.\(^{15}\) The Arbroath principles of 1320 are also widely invoked as the foundational statement of a long tradition of Scottish popular sovereignty,\(^{16}\) a tradition also accepted and celebrated among Labour and Liberal supporters in Scotland as part of a long Scottish radical tradition embodied in the Covenanting movement of the seventeenth century, the radicalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and on the progressive Left in the twentieth century.\(^{17}\) However, not only did the Declaration of Arbroath bequeath modern Scottish nationalists a tradition of popular sovereignty, more


\(^{16}\) E.J. Cowan, \textquote{For Freedom Alone’: The Declaration of Arbroath, 1320} (East Linton, 2003).

\(^{17}\) See e.g. T. Brotherstone (ed.), \textit{Covenant, charter and party} (Aberdeen, 1989); J. Hearn, \textit{Claiming Scotland: national identity and liberal culture} (Edinburgh, 2000).
ambiguously it has also infused nationalists, notwithstanding their republican preferences, with a pride in Scotland as an historic kingdom.

Or is it, perhaps, wrong to focus too exclusively on a Scottish dimension to the problem of Scotland and monarchy? Has Scotland since the eighteenth century become so well-integrated - unlike Ireland - within the British state, that the reticent republicanism of Scots is best explained in terms of the marginality of republican ideas within British political culture as a whole, north as well as south of the border? Is Scottish political culture - notwithstanding obvious flashes of local colour and a distinct set of historical associations - broadly similar in its basic contours to the norms of English political life? Does Scottish nationalism itself conform - in this respect at least - to British standards of political propriety? The answer which follows addresses both Scotland’s own peculiarities and the British commonalities which lie behind this strange phenomenon of the republicanism that rarely barks.

This sort of patterning, which combines shared British characteristics and vividly distinctive Scottish motifs, has been in evidence in Scottish politics since the Union of 1707. Some features of Scottish political culture were utterly distinctive, others closely aped English, now British, political norms; and certain phenomena carried both English and Scottish inflections. From our perspective what is most intriguing is that a culture so rich provided multiple - albeit seemingly contradictory - ways of articulating dissent, grievance, disloyalty or mere huffy disengagement from the eighteenth-century British state.
The most obvious kind of dissidence in Scotland, at least during the first half of the eighteenth century, was Jacobitism. Eighteenth-century Scotland - or more particularly the Highlands and north-eastern Lowlands around Aberdeen - was the heartland of Jacobitism, and a nursery of Jacobite rebellions in 1708, 1715, 1719 and 1745. Jacobites, who tended to be Episcopalians or Roman Catholics, celebrated the high antiquity in Scotland of indefeasible, hereditary monarchy. After the accession of the Hanoverians in 1714 Jacobitism offered Scots the alternative of an independent Stuart state ruled by Scotland’s native royal line to the double alienation attendant upon subordination to an English-dominated union under a German dynasty.

Although Jacobitism was a partisan, confessional or regional cause in the first half of the eighteenth century in Scotland, the Jacobites’ undoubted opposition to the Union of 1707 and the seemingly higher levels of Jacobite activity in Scotland than in other parts of these islands, gave rise to an assumption which, in the longer run, has lodged in the national memory: the influential notion that the ideals of Scottish independence and the dynastic claims of the Stuarts were closely linked, if not indistinguishable. To espouse Jacobitism in the early eighteenth century was to cock a snook at the British state, and it continued in the late eighteenth century and beyond to offer a means of articulating discontent with - and suggesting one’s distance from - the Hanoverian status quo. After the defeat of the Jacobites at Culloden in 1746, sentimental Jacobitism survived as a mode of expression. Although no longer hitched to a plausible set of political goals, it offered

the easy sense of estrangement from the post-1688 - or more especially post-1707 - powers-that-be. Nostalgic yearnings for a lost Scottish nationhood often took a Jacobite form, regardless of whether the nationalist dreamer was a convinced supporter of the lost cause of the Stuarts.

Jacobitism did nothing to obliterate the more distant historical memory of the Scottish War of Independence. The stirring deeds of the War had been celebrated by two late medieval epic poems, John Barbour’s *Bruce* (1375?) and the *Wallace* (c. 1477) by Blind Harry the Minstrel. Barbour’s *Bruce* and Harry’s *Wallace* remained staple features of Scottish reading throughout the eighteenth century, partly, it has been argued, as a nationalist reaction to the Union of 1707. Editions of the *Wallace* appeared in 1709, 1713, 1722, 1728, 1737 and 1758, while the *Bruce* was reprinted in 1737 and 1758.¹⁹ Nevertheless, as with Jacobitism in the later eighteenth century, the undoubted resonance of the medieval War of Independence by then was more purely sentimental: to keep alive the idea of Scottish nationhood within the Union, not to agitate for independence or to challenge the Union *per se*.

Whiggish loyalty in Scotland also had its own local peculiarities. Scots and English Whigs alike celebrated the *English* Glorious Revolution of 1688 as an achievement pregnant with significance for Britain as a whole. In several respects, Scottish Revolution culture of the eighteenth century was roughly congruent with its English counterpart; but occasionally tensions and inconsistencies came into focus. After all, Scots also had a native Whig tradition of their own, which drew upon

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Scotland's own distinct realm of memory. In particular, Scotland was home to a Whig-Presbyterian tradition which championed limited monarchy - indeed, a monarchy so limited, that to English (and Scots Episcopalian) eyes, it seemed quasi-republican, or at least anti-monarchical. Resistance to monarchy was much less circumscribed among Scottish Whigs than in the English Whig tradition. A canon of Presbyterian political theory formed during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - from George Buchanan’s *De iure regni apud Scotos* (1579), by way of Samuel Rutherford’s *Lex, rex* (1644), to *A Hind Let Loose* (1687) by the later Covenanter Alexander Shields - had justified resistance to ungodly kings, and flirted too with the right of private individuals to assassinate unrighteous tyrants. The works of Buchanan, Rutherford and the later Covenanting writers were different in kind from even the most Whiggish elements in the Tory-dominated tradition of Anglican political thought. Whereas English Whigs tended to celebrate a harmoniously balanced ancient constitution of king, lords and commons, the Scottish Whig tradition seemed full of menace, dangerously fixated upon king-killing.

During the early decades of the eighteenth century Scots Episcopalian and their Anglican co-religionists, especially Tories and Nonjuring Jacobites, used the anniversary of the Royal Martyr Charles I’s execution on 30 January 1649 as a means of casting aspersions on Scots Presbyterian politics. Could any kings, they

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wondered, trust to the capriciously conditional loyalty of Scots Presbyterians? Had not rebellious Scots Presbyterians triggered the troubles which undid Charles I? Indeed, did not Scots Presbyterians bear the major share of responsibility for the regicide? Quite simply, Presbyterianism, it was argued, was incompatible with royal government of any kind, Williamite, Hanoverian or Stuart. Scots Presbyterians were routinely accused of being crypto-Catholics, of having absorbed the king-killing principles and practices of the Jesuits and a variant of the papal deposing power, into their own dangerously democratic scheme of ecclesiastical politics, where every minister - worryingly - was the equal of every other and where no clerical hierarchy existed. Other Episcopalian pamphleteers went further. Some denounced Scots Presbyterians as Calves’ head republicans who struck knives into the head of a calf on 30 January, in a vicious double parody of the royal execution and the Eucharist. In defence Scots Presbyterian preachers used 30 January sermons as a way of wiping away the reproaches of their adversaries. The Presbyterian 30 January sermon was largely a matter of defending the denomination from the charge of republicanism and rebellion. The Reverend James Anderson, the minister of the Scots Presbyterian church at Swallow St. in London, delivered a 30 January sermon in 1715 under the self-exculpating title No king-killers.

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22 Se e.g. William Dugud, Plain dealing with Presbyterians (1719), pp. 11-12; Andrew Cant, A sermon preached on the XXX day of January (Edinburgh, 1703-4).

23 See e.g. David Freebairn, Queries to the Presbyterian ministers of Scotland (1712-13?); William Mylne, A time to weep; or the reasonableness of continuing the observation of the XXX day of January in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1720), p. 33.

24 See e.g. Mylne, Time to weep, pp. 6-7: Dugud, Plain Dealing, pp. 19-20.

25 For the broader context, see Kidd, Subverting Scotland’s past, pp. 51-69.

On its ultra-Presbyterian margins especially, Scottish Whig culture seemed grudging in its adherence to monarchy. Indeed, some aspects of Scots Presbyterian outspokenness seemed to carry a sulphurous whiff of quasi-republicanism. Eighteenth-century Scots Presbyterians outside the established Kirk itself, whether among the Reformed Presbyterians (the heirs of the Covenanters) or in the Seceding churches (which began to break away from the Church establishment from 1733 over the issue of lay patronage in ministerial appointments), could seem gruff, terse and suspicious in their attitudes to monarchy. Nevertheless conditional loyalty rarely, if ever, developed into full-blown republicanism. Rather discussions of the perceived flaws of the British monarchy were framed within parameters set by the Covenants of 1638 and 1643, and, above all, by the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter 23 of which dealt with the civil magistrate.27 The Auld Licht Anti-Burgher, the Reverend Archibald Bruce, who was the divinity professor for his branch of the Secession, denounced particular pretensions of the monarchy as abominations, though without lapsing into republicanism as such. What Bruce disliked in the monarchy was not the fact of kingly rule itself but rather the ecclesiastical usurpations of the monarchy which had survived since the botched Reformation of Henry VIII. Since the Henrician Reformation Anglican monarchs had acquired the illegitimate powers of a monstrous caesaro-popery.28 According to


28 Archibald Bruce, Reflections on Freedom of Writing (1794), pp. 8-9; Bruce, A Brief Statement and Declaration of the Genuine Principles of Seceders (n.p., 1799), p. 56.
Bruce, the English Reformation settlement had turned the monarch into an ‘English pontifex maximus’.  

Scottish Whig culture encompassed both loyal politeness of the most anglicised kind, and an unruly rumbustiousness which seemed tinged with disaffection. As Professor Chris Whatley has shown, from the late seventeenth century to the mid nineteenth, the King’s Birthday was the most important date in Scottish public calendar of civic ceremonial. It often degenerated, he shows, by way of saturnalian boisterousness, into drunken riot. Nevertheless Whatley does not doubt the basic Hanoverian loyalty of the Scottish mob in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The tacitly licensed aggression and plebeian intimidation on the King’s birthday functioned primarily as a ‘safety-valve’ for the expression of grievances, not as a theatre of quasi-republican dissidence.

The first century of Anglo-Scottish incorporation gave rise to a kind of amphibiousness in political culture, which still persists: a capacity to inhabit Anglo-British and Scottish cultures simultaneously. A vivid example of such amphibiousness came at the centenary of the Revolution. Significantly, Scotland celebrated the centenary in 1788, notwithstanding the fact that its own Revolution to overthrow James VII had occurred not in 1688, but in 1689. Yet 1788 also saw Scotland’s own less abashed Revolution principles set in stone with the erection of a

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monument in his birthplace, Killearn, to the sixteenth-century Scots proponent of resistance and king-killing, George Buchanan.\textsuperscript{32}

Odder still, Presbyterian prickliness towards post-1707 British monarchs co-existed in Scottish culture with a sentimental hankering after the cause - the safely lost cause - of the Stuarts, and also with a pronounced strain of anti-Hanoverianism. The late eighteenth-century vernacular poet, Robert Burns (1759-96), who would become in time Scotland’s national bard, exhibits precisely this languid and untroubled agility, moving as he did among different varieties of Whiggism and ostensible Jacobite positions within a diverse oeuvre which included a number of political poems, election ballads and Jacobite songs. Burns’s own particular amphibiousness owes much to his parentage. His father, William Burness, came to Ayrshire from the epicentre of Jacobite Episcopalianism in the north-east of Scotland, while his mother, Agnes Broun, was of proud Ayrshire Covenanting stock.\textsuperscript{33} Burns celebrated both branches of his lineage, and was adept at switching personae. Politically, he was of a Whiggish cast, but seems to have alternated between conservative Pittite Whiggism - which, confusingly, he sometimes alluded to in his poetry as Toryism\textsuperscript{34} - and a more radical strain of Whiggery indebted in some measure both to an older Scots Presbyterian tradition and to the new ideals of the late eigh-


\textsuperscript{33} Donaldson, \textit{Jacobite Song}, pp. 73-5.


\textsuperscript{35} See L. McIlvanney, \textit{Burns the Radical} (East Linton, 2002), for the various ideological components of Burns’s radicalism.
teenth-century republican revolutions in America and France.\textsuperscript{35} Sometimes, oddly, Burns - adopting a Jacobite mantle - feigned denial of his own political creed:

\begin{verbatim}
Awa whigs awa,
Awa whigs awa,
Ye’re but a pack o’ traitor louns,
Ye’ll do nae guid at a’\textsuperscript{36}
\end{verbatim}

However, Burns’s Jacobitism seems more precisely to have been a sentimental type, and altogether compatible with an open declaration of Whig commitment.\textsuperscript{37}

At the centenary of the Glorious Revolution in 1788, Burns wrote a lengthy letter to the \textit{Edinburgh Evening Courant} lamenting that the Revolution principles of the Whigs, which he otherwise supported, seemed to have fostered a sneering disregard for the plight of the Stuarts:

\begin{quote}
Bred and educated in Revolution principles…it could not be any silly political prejudice that made my heart revolt at the harsh abusive manner in which the reverend gentleman mentioned the House of Stuart, and which, I am afraid, was too much the language of that day...That [the Stuarts] failed, I bless my God most fervently, but cannot join in the ridicule against them...Let every Briton, and particularly every Scotsman, who ever looked with reverential pity on the dotage of a parent, cast a veil over the fatal mistakes of the kings of his forefathers...\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}

This kind of sentimental Jacobitism surfaced too in poetry and song, sometimes accompanied by his own brand of sneering disregard for the Hanoverian line:

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The injur’d Stewart line are gone.

A race outlandish fill their throne;

An idiot race, to honour lost;

Who know them best despise them most\^{39}

This is not to suggest that Burns favoured toppling the Hanoverians, restoring the Stuarts and dismantling the Union of 1707: those kinds of measures had long ceased to be practical policy options.\^{40} Nonetheless it is indicative of the rich body of idioms and material available to Scots for the expression - however mild or impractical - of disaffection from the British monarchy and the power centres of the Union-state. At this stage outright republicanism was a marginal phenomenon, as it had been more generally in eighteenth-century Scottish political culture. Burns, like many others Scots of radical inclinations during the 1790s, did little more than gesture at the possibility of a full-blown republican alternative.

Disaffection from the monarchy became a more common feature of nineteenth-century British political culture: still a minority phenomenon on the radical margins of political life, but around 1870, briefly, a seemingly plausible option, with an organised movement behind it. Historians of British anti-monarchism in the nineteenth century are careful not to reduce a cause underpinned by a diverse portfolio of discontents to the narrow category of republicanism. The culture of British ‘anti-monarchism’ - the preferred term - was much richer, and more am-

\^{39} Kinsley (ed.), *Poems and songs*, I., p. 348.

biguous, than mere republicanism. Antony Taylor identifies three strands in an eclectic and heterogeneous anti-monarchist culture. Alongside what might be called political republicanism, he situates two other kinds of anti-monarchism which were far removed from the standard template of Paineite republican radicalism. Less highbrow than republicanism proper and less directly political was a crude, scurrilous anti-monarchism, which took a kind of perverse delight in being outraged by royal extravagance and scandal. This type of anti-monarchism was itself reducible to various sub-genres: outraged puritanism, faux-outraged prurience, longstanding anxieties about Old Corruption and penny-pinching concerns about the costs of monarchy. Related to this was the third - and most strangely ironic - of the strains of populist anti-monarchism identified by Taylor, namely a disgruntled loyalism. This constituted an example of the fickleness of popular royalism. The royalist public wanted to see the monarch in full fig in the public performance of royal duties, such as they were, on high days in the royal calendar; and disappointment led easily to a kind of disaffection. Queen Victoria’s withdrawal from public life after the death of her consort Prince Albert in 1861 produced in time irritation as well as sympathy from royalists. There were further complexities to the culture of anti-monarchism as it developed in the late 1860s and especially early 1870s. Richard Williams has drawn a sharp distinction between the middle-class and working-class versions of republicanism which were touted at the time, though both were well beyond the pale of conventional party politics.

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Williams demonstrates how the monarchy was not in itself the principal bugbear of British republican radicalism, but was associated with other more compelling offences. Monarchy, for example, was a glaring example of privileges conferred by birth alone; which embroiled the monarchy in the demonology of those radicals who favoured a meritocratic society. Monarchy was also considered in another idiom of radical complaint to be a major obstacle to the full realisation of the sovereignty of a democratic people. Transference and displacement of these sorts complicates and refines our understanding of what is sometimes, too cavalierly, billed as republicanism.42

In its broad outlines Scotland’s own anti-monarchism resembled that of England, but Scottish ‘republicanism’ was if anything more complicated and ambivalent, because inflected by the particularities - remembered, misremembered, exaggerated and distorted - of the Scottish historical experience. Scottish republicanism, like English republicanism, of which it was largely an offshoot, was at best no more than a radical fringe; but north of the border this fringe seems to have been tinged - no more than that perhaps - with a nationalist colouring. Andrew Carnegie’s reminiscences of his boyhood in Dunfermline point to the existence of an anti-monarchical culture in certain quarters of the Scottish working class: ‘The denunciations of monarchical and aristocratic government, of privilege in all its forms, the grandeur of the republican system...these were the exciting themes upon which I was nurtured. As a child I could have slain king, duke, or lord, and considered their deaths a service to the state’. Republican zealotry coexisted for the young Carnegie with a pride in the Scottish War of Independence, and the

achievements of Wallace and Bruce. However, Robert the Bruce posed a dilemma for the young patriot. Carnegie recalled, somewhat guiltily, that ‘King Robert the Bruce never got justice from my cousin or myself in childhood. It was enough for us that he was a king while Wallace was the man of the people.’ Nor did the Scots-American industrialist ever quite lose his ambivalence on the subject of Bruce.43

Yet insofar as the British monarchy in the nineteenth century raised issues concerning national identity these tended to arise not from English-Scottish differences, but from British-German tensions. A more diffuse anti-Germanism evolved out of (though it never entirely displaced) anti-Hanoverianism of the sort articulated by Burns in the late eighteenth century. Anti-Germanism, and a more specific anti-Hanoverianism directed at the house of Brunswick, surfaced on a widening fringe of mid nineteenth-century British political discourse. While Prince Albert was alive, his adviser Baron Stockmar became the focus of suspicions that he was importing German absolutist principles into court circles, a controversy which resumed with the appearance of Theodore Martin’s multi-volume biography of Albert in the 1870s and 1880s.44 Anti-Germanism as well as questions of cost surfaced in Charles Bradlaugh’s republican polemic, The Impeachment of the House of Brunswick (1871).45

The early 1870s constituted modern Britain’s short-lived republican moment - and modern Scotland’s republican moment too. There were eighty-five republi-


can clubs in Britain between 1871 and 1874. Furthermore, republican activism out of doors emboldened a less deferential mood at Westminster. In July 1871 fifty-one MPs voted for a reduction in the allowance given to Prince Arthur, and eleven for an outright rejection of the grant.\footnote{F. D’Arcy, ‘Charles Bradlaugh and the English republican movement, 1868-1878’, \textit{Historical Journal} 25 (1982), 367-83, at p. 374; \textit{House of Commons Debates} 208 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., 31 July 1871, col. 590.} This was modern Scotland’s republican moment too, and it had nothing to do with nationalism; being rather a subsidiary of a wider British republican cause. Seven of the clubs were in Scotland - in Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Perth, Paisley and Aberdeen, as well as one in the smaller industrial town of Newmilns in an area which had a proud radical heritage.\footnote{E.G. Collieu, ‘The radical attitude towards the monarchy and the House of Lords, 1868-1885’ (unpublished Oxford University B. Litt. thesis, 1936), p. 148; C. Rumsey, \textit{The rise and fall of British republican clubs 1871-1874} (Oswestry, 2000), Appendix 2, p. 105.}

However, the anti-monarchist critique of Victorian seclusion and the financial costs of the monarchy was particularly thorny - and richly ironic - as far as Scotland was concerned. The anti-monarchist slogan ‘What does she do with it?’ referred most obviously to the Queen’s wealth,\footnote{W.M. Kuhn, ‘Queen Victoria’s Civil list: What did she do with it?’ \textit{Historical Journal} 36 (1993), 645-65.} which was clearly not supporting a public programme of royal duties, but also operated as a double entendre, a sly insinuation about the Queen’s relationship with her Scots manservant John Brown. There was resentment at the proposed £30,000 dowry to be made on the marriage of Princess Louise to the heir of the Duke of Argyll, the Marquis of Lorne, which seemed to cement the royal dynasty’s connections with Scotland’s quasi-feudal baronial magnates.\footnote{A. Taylor ‘An aristocratic monarchy and popular republicanism 1830-1940’, in A. Olechnowicz (ed.), \textit{The Monarchy and the British nation 1780 to the present} (Cambridge, 2007), p. 199.} The Balmoral factor operated in other ways too. In November
1873, after considerable hesitation and anguished consultation with advisers, Queen Victoria took communion in the Church of Scotland at Crathie Church, near Balmoral; and would do so thereafter on her visits to her Aberdeenshire estate. This bold step earned the Queen considerable popular support in Scotland.  

The British republican moment - north and south of the border - was a brief spasm of protest, which rapidly waned. The recovery of the otherwise errant Prince of Wales from a near-lethal bout of typhoid in December 1871 provoked an outpouring of popular sympathy, which culminated in a public service of thanksgiving at St. Paul’s in February 1872. In general, moreover, the associations of republicanism brought it into bad odour with Victorian respectability, in Presbyterian Scotland as much as in England. Republicanism was part of an ensemble of avant-garde ideas which horrified Victorian proprieties. Republicanism was linked to rationalism and atheism which were offensive enough in themselves to mainstream opinion, but, worse still, republican secularists also tended to be involved in the promotion of ‘Malthusianism’, or birth control. Such dubious connexions kept republicanism well to the daringly radical fringes of British society. The links between republicanism and such bodies as the Edinburgh Secular Society did nothing to win republican ideas a wider hearing in Scottish society.

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Nevertheless, notwithstanding its marginality, Scottish alienation from the British monarchy remained highly distinctive in its modes of expression. Jacobitism, whether whimsical, sentimental or unrealistically serious in intent, continued, long after the mid-eighteenth-century defeat of the Jacobite cause, to shape Scottish the matter and idioms of Scottish political argument. Odder still, the influence of Jacobitism seems to have been felt as much among staunchly anti-royalist radicals as among romantic poseurs. Even the staunchly rationalist John Mackinnon Robertson (1856-1933) seemed to succumb to a Jacobite-inflected anti-Hanoverianism, in his anticipatory shudder at the imminent prospect of Queen Victoria’s golden jubilee. Walter Scott’s stage management of George IV’s tartan-festooned visit to Edinburgh in 1822 had, on reflection, been dreadful enough; pointedly, Robertson expressed ‘sympathetic shame at the spectacle of a Scott at the foot of a Guelph’.  

John Morrison Davidson (1843-1916) provides a vivid example of Scots Jacobite republicanism. Born and raised in the north-east of Scotland - the heartland of both Episcopalianism and the Jacobitism which it long underpinned - Davidson made a career in London as a barrister and political reformer. Notwithstanding Davidson’s life as a London-based expatriate, his Scottish background continued to shape expression of his political beliefs, not least his republicanism. Davidson was a declared opponent of privilege. He published works attacking aristocracy and feudal landownership, such as his Book of Lords (1884) and also celebrated the mid-seventeenth-century English land occupation movement, the Diggers. Davidson drew upon English as well as Scottish radical mythologies, dreaming of a return to

the supposedly popular forms of Saxon landholding which predated the imposition of the Norman Yoke. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Davidson ran as a parliamentary candidate in Greenock at the general election of 1885 for the Scottish Land Restoration League.

Aristocrats were not the only villains in Davidson’s demonology. So too were monarchs. Davidson set out his anti-monarchical agenda in *The New Book of Kings* (1884). A special edition was published in 1897 for Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, and by its 1902 iteration, to mark Edward VII’s coronation, Davidson claimed it had sold 130,000 copies in its various printings. Indeed, Davidson associated royalist fawning with the inflexions of English political culture, and contended that for centuries - at least since the days of Buchanan in the sixteenth century - Scottish political ideas had followed very a different course. Buchanan, he claimed, ‘had openly avowed the most advanced republican doctrines’. Such ideas had influenced the way in which the Scottish political nation treated its rulers. ‘England,’ Davidson proclaimed, ‘has long been a king-ridden, Scotland a king-riding nation’. Alongside Buchanan, Fletcher of Saltoun - ‘this inflexible Home Rule republican Scot’ - was another hero of Davidson’s. Davidson recognised that at bottom it was Presbyterianism which immunised Scots against the ‘monarchical madness’ which Anglicanism seemed to foster south of the border. Scotland, by sharp contrast, was ‘essentially a republican country’. Notwithstanding the differences Davidson perceived between the political cultures of Scotland and England, his
Scottish nationalism was limited to a vigorous championship of home rule within a decentralized ‘British republic, federal, social and democratic’.  

Curiously, Davidson was not only opposed to monarchy in principle, but seems to have had a particular aversion to ‘Brunswick royalty’, that is to the Hanoverians. ‘Something might be said in defence of legitimist monarchy,’ Davidson conceded, ‘on the score of romantic sentiment if not of reason: but God wot, there is no romance connected with Guelphs and Wettins’. Like Burns, he reckoned the Hanoverians ‘an idiot race’, and also went on to question their legitimacy. Davidson pointedly referred to Queen Victoria as ‘Madame Guelph’. The Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Davidson regretted as ‘the sickening apotheosis of odious Brunswick royalty’. Davidson’s odd flirtation with Jacobitism not only took the obvious form of anti-German sentiments, but also encompassed disenchantment with the Whig Revolution of 1688. This ‘make-believe rosewater Revolution’ had done little more than transform an ‘unlimited monarchy’ into an ‘unlimited oligarchy’. At one level Davidson’s critique of the Glorious Revolution constituted a radical gripe about an opportunity lost, but at another more visceral level it amounted to a deep-seated anti-Whig prejudice. He recalled the sentimental Jacobite sentiments of his Aberdeenshire childhood, and confessing that whosoever ‘drank it in with his mother’s milk must ever retain some residue of the measureless scorn of the wee, wee German lairdie’. Davidson perceived that legitimist monarchy was a harder nut for republicans to crack than the German usurpers who had acceded in 1714 on

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the basis of Whig Revolution principles: ‘even as a royal fetich the Queen is at best a third-rate idolon’.

Bizarrely, the late Victorian era also witnessed a curious renaissance of Jacobite nationalism at the eccentric fringes of Scottish political culture under the auspices of a Scots Australian, Theodore Napier (1845-1924), who had returned to the motherland after a period as President of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, an expatriate Scottish home rule organisation which he set up in 1891. Once ensconced in Edinburgh Napier became the Scottish secretary of the Legitimist Jacobite League of Great Britain and Ireland. Under its auspices he made an annual pilgrimage to the site of the battle of Culloden to lay a wreath in memory of the Jacobite fallen. Napier regarded the predicament of Scotland within the Union of 1707 and the divine right of the Stuarts as tightly interwoven. The incorporating Union of 1707, Napier claimed, had been among the ‘bitter fruits’ of the Revolution of 1688. In its place he favoured a loose federation of the British Isles under a legitimist Stuart monarchy. A restoration of the legitimate Jacobite monarch - who, by the late 1890s was Napier’s beloved Queen, Princess Maria Theresa of Bavaria (1849-1919) - also implied the replacement of the Union with a federation of the four British nations. This was all a fantastical dream. However, Napier contended - in a less implausible moment - that there was ‘a large and

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powerful under-current of sympathy towards the Royal House of Stuart yet remaining in Scotland’. Of course, he conceded, this existed largely ‘in sympathy and sentiment’, yet the flourishing of a culture of Jacobite song, he believed, helped to ‘prepare the ground for a Jacobite harvest’. A Jacobite restoration meant ‘restoration likewise to Scotland of her long-lost Parliament, of which she was deprived by an usurping government.’

Republicanism occupied a somewhat surreal niche in Napier’s quaintly anti-quarian political vision. Napier had an intense dislike of modernity, most especially of democracy, socialism and republicanism. Yet, although no republican, and confessing that he preferred the rule of a usurper such as Queen Victoria to the horrors of republican rule, Napier perceived the instrumental utility of republicanism nonetheless. The future, it seemed, was not entirely bleak. The very fact, he reckoned, that the Hanoverians constituted an uninspiring dynasty of usurpers might well hasten processes of reform and revolution in Britain. Yet, in the long run Napier foresaw the prospect of Britons ultimately recoiling from the emptiness of republican government, with a prompt reversion to legitimist Jacobite monarchy.

A further British republican moment loomed, it seemed, during the latter stages of the First World War and its aftermath. The monarchies of Europe appeared to be staggering. The Romanovs fell in the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Hohenzollerns lost the German throne at the conclusion of the War. The top-


60 Ibid., pp. 24-6.
pling of the Wittelsbach dynasty in Bavaria in November 1918 produced fine pick-
ings for connoisseurs of irony: King Ludwig III, the last King of Bavaria, was forced
to flee the German revolution with his wife, Queen Maria Theresa, the very Jaco-
bite heiress whose restoration had been so fervently championed by Napier and his
fellow legitimists. 61 In Britain itself King George V and his courtiers foresaw serious
problems ahead, and the need to rehabilitate the monarchy as a more recognisably
British entity. The royal house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha transformed itself into the
House of Windsor in 1917, having contemplated various other options for rebrand-
ing, including York, Lancaster and Plantagenet. A royal press secretary was ap-
pointed, the Order of the British Empire was created, and, perhaps most important
of all, Britain, it was decided, would not become a place of asylum for the de-
posed crowned heads of Europe. 62

Industrial Glasgow - ‘Red Clydeside’ 63 as it has come to be known - appeared
to be the focal point of Bolshevik-style agitation in Britain. Foremost among those
Scots whose Marxist republicanism came with a Scottish nationalist tinge was the
schoolteacher John MacLean (1879-1923). The new Bolshevik government made
MacLean the Soviet consul in Scotland in 1918, but his status was not recognised by
the British government. Indeed, he was imprisoned for sedition in 1918, though re-
leased at the Armistice. MacLean lamented the formation of the Communist Party
of Great Britain in 1921, and the failure to marry Communism with Scottish nation-
alism. MacLean had been involved in the formation of the Scots National League in

61 I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Frank Muller, for this point.

(1999), 27-51.

63 Cf. I. McLean, The Legend of Red Clydeside (Edinburgh, 1983).
1920, and idealised a misty Celtic past as the incubator of an indigenous Gaelic communism. Nor was Jacobitism entirely beyond the pale of MacLean’s Communist-nationalism. In his short leaflet All Hail, the Scottish Workers’ Republic (1920) MacLean celebrated Jacobite resistance to the British state: ‘The rebellions of 1715 and 1745 were natural reactions against the treacherous deed of 1707’.  

Scots Communist flirtation was not confined to MacLean. The radical poet and polemicist Hugh MacDiarmid (the pen-name of Christopher Murray Grieve) wrote an article for the nationalist newspaper, the Scots Independent, on the bicentenary of the Forty-five rebellion entitled ‘A Scots Communist looks at Bonny Prince Charlie’. Here MacDiarmid sang the praises of the USSR’s encouragement of minority cultures and languages, and perceived the historical inevitability of a similar outcome closer to home – ‘a federation of Celtic republics of Great Britain.’ Bonnie Prince Charlie’s ‘efficacy’, as MacDiarmid put it, was ‘as a symbol of the Gaelic Commonwealth restored.’ In particular, the Jacobite cause had contributed to a glorious revival in the eighteenth century of Gaelic verse. Nor was Jacobitism extinguished as a source of inspiration. Two centuries on, MacDiarmid believed, it retained an ‘unexhausted evolutionary momentum’. Of course, he admitted, the Stuarts had ‘great faults’; but they were, ‘in every way, nevertheless, superior to their appalling Germanic successors.’ Elsewhere, MacDiarmid described himself

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65 A. Bold, MacDiarmid (London, 1988).

as ‘the heir of the great Scottish republican and radical traditions’, and his typescript ‘Red Scotland’ (c.1936) was suppressed by the publishers Routledge for its libellous hostility to royalty. Yet, MacDiarmid’s republican commitment to Scottish self-government still comprehended a regard - in some measure at least - for the country’s native dynasty.

Seeming anachronisms from a lost eighteenth-century Scotland, both anti-Hanoverianism and Jacobitism enjoyed a strange afterlife in twentieth-century Scottish nationalism. Contemporaries recognised that the spectral idea of Jacobitism - however disembodied from the cause of the Stuarts - served a continuing function in Scottish political culture. In 1928 the novelist and romantic nationalist Compton Mackenzie, writing in the Pictish Review, claimed that ‘for many years a sentimental Jacobitism is the emotion that has kept alive the idea of Scotland as a nation’.

Certainly, remembrance of Scotland as an independent kingdom continued to leave an imprint on the rhetoric of nationalist complaint. In the early hours of Christmas Day 1950 a small group of nationalist students stole - or liberated, depending on one’s point of view - the royal inauguration stone, the Stone of Scone, from Westminster Abbey. The stunt exploited historic memories of the Scottish War of Independence, and in particular the perfidy of Edward I of England, who had


68 S. Lyall, Hugh MacDiarmid’s poetry and politics of place: imagining a Scottish republic (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 124.

69 For a general overview of this curious phenomenon, see Pittock, Invention of Scotland, pp. 134-65.

removed the Stone to Westminster and who remained - and still remains - a vili-
lainous boo-figure in Scottish popular demonology. The Stone was returned to the
authorities in the symbolically important setting of Arbroath Abbey in the spring of
1951.71

The accession of Queen Elizabeth as Elizabeth II in 1952 and her subse-
quent ‘reception’ of the Scottish regalia in 1953 - the pale equivalent of a proper
Scottish coronation - again guided nationalists onto royal terrain. The Queen’s
style as Elizabeth II provoked some disquiet - if not outrage - in Scotland, and not
only in the usual quarters. The only previous Queen Elizabeth had never ruled
Scotland, and had reigned in England before the Union of the Crowns of 1603, nev-
er mind the Union of 1707 which established a united British monarchy. In defer-
ence to historical fact, the provosts of three Scottish burghs understandably omit-
ted the royal numeral when proclaiming the new Queen.72 The new royal style also
provoked incidents of vandalism, the destruction of pillar boxes bearing the Royal
Mail’s ‘E II R’ insignia, which was subsequently modified for postboxes in
Scotland.73 This apparently trivial issue of the royal numeral would still remain an
irritant to angry nationalists half a century later.74

On the day of the Queen’s coronation in Westminster Abbey as Elizabeth II,
Wendy Wood, the flamboyant leader of an organisation called the Scottish Patriots,

71 Ian Hamilton, Stone of Destiny (Edinburgh, 2008 edn.). For the symbolic importance of the
Stone, see R. Welander, D. Breeze, and T. Clancy (eds.), The Stone of Destiny: artefact and icon
(Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, Edinburgh, 2003).


74 See e.g. Winnie Ewing, Stop the World (Edinburgh, 2004), p. 320.
read out a republican declaration of sorts in Aberdeen: ‘that as you cannot have a second before a first...therefore, whether the Queen wished to be or not (and I am not against the right kind of monarchy)....our land [is] now a Republic...’. Yet a few months afterwards Wood was incensed by the affront to Scotland offered by the Queen when on her visit to St Giles Cathedral for the ‘reception’ of the crown of Scotland, the new monarch had worn, instead of ceremonial vestments, a ‘plain blue shopping dress’. Worse still, the Queen had received the crown with an obtrusively quotidian handbag dangling from her arm. Where was the sacred mystery of majesty? Notwithstanding her republican outburst in 1953, Wood later conceded that ‘Scotland as a whole’ was not ‘republican minded’; rather Scotland, she felt, ‘would perhaps like a monarch of her own, born to the traditions and truly representing our nation.’ Wood’s theatrical version of nationalism teetered between republicanism and legitimism.\(^75\)

Wood’s band of Scottish Patriots was not the only nationalist organisation competing with the SNP for the promotion of Scottish nationalist ideas in the early 1950s. Another was the Scottish Covenant Association of John MacCormick, which had evolved out of his earlier grouping Scottish Convention. MacCormick had played a central role in the formation of the NPS in 1928, and later the SNP in 1934, but had broken with the SNP during World War II against what seemed like the unrealistic extremism of its posturing against the British state. Ever the pragmatist, MacCormick tried to resolve the matter of the Queen’s royal style in the courts. His suit, MacCormick versus Lord Advocate, was unsuccessful; the Queen’s

style, the Court of Session pronounced, was a matter of the royal prerogative.\textsuperscript{76}

Nevertheless, there were some significant side-effects from MacCormick’s quixotic litigation. The Lord President of the Court of Session, Lord Cooper, took the opportunity presented by the case to argue in his decision that Scottish compliance on state occasions of such high importance should not simply be taken for granted. In particular, Cooper contended, in a departure from current juridical norms - north as much as south of the border - that the Scots constitutional tradition was very different from the Westminster principle of parliamentary sovereignty:

The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of parliament is a distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law....Considering that the Union legislation extinguished the parliaments of Scotland and England and replaced them by a new parliament, I have difficulty seeing why it should have been supposed that the new parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English parliament but none of the Scottish parliament, as if all that happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were admitted to the parliament of England.\textsuperscript{77}

In the longer term Cooper provided a veneer of respectable judicial cover for those Scots who argued - without much real historical sensitivity - that from the Declaration of Arbroath via George Buchanan to the attainment of devolution by way of referendum in 1997 the supposedly authentic constitutional tradition of Scotland was grounded in popular sovereignty and very different indeed from the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. John MacCormick himself would promote this distinction in his book \textit{The Flag in the Wind} (1955).\textsuperscript{78}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} \textit{Session Cases 1953}, pp. 396-418.
\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 411.
\item \textsuperscript{78} John MacCormick, \textit{The Flag in the Wind} (London, 1955), pp. 189-90.
\end{itemize}
Indeed, the 1953 judgment in MacCormick v Lord Advocate was a crucial turning-point in Scottish constitutional theory. One of the most influential developments in Scottish political thought during the second half of the twentieth century was the increasingly widespread currency enjoyed by a distorted version of Cooper’s controversial statement from the bench. By the 1980s the Scottish political classes – Labour and Liberal as much as Nationalist – had come to endorse the distinction between an indigenous conception of Scottish popular sovereignty and the Westminster norm of parliamentary sovereignty, which was rejected as both elitist and alien to the historic political tradition of the Scottish nation. The Claim of Right (1988), endorsed by most Scottish Labour and Liberal politicians in 1989 articulated the new language of Scottish popular sovereignty: ‘We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional Convention, do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of government best suited to their needs.’ Interestingly, the idea of popular sovereignty was ambiguously quasi-republican in effect, but did not explicitly exclude the monarchy. The idea of a historic doctrine of Scottish popular sovereignty, embodied in the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320, which appeared to limit the authority of the Scottish crown, has allowed nationalist politicians to square their supporters’ republican commitments with the wider acceptance of the monarchy in the electorate at large. Popular sovereignty not only allows Scottish politicians to articulate a constitutional alter-

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native to the dominant mode of English constitutional interpretation, but also to
navigate without major difficulty between popular republicanism and popular roy-
alism.

Highlighting the difference between what might be called 1320 principles
from the 1688 principles which underpin the English tradition of parliamentary
sovereignty allows Scottish politicians to invoke quasi-republican values without
openly challenging monarchy. Moreover, the Scottish intelligentsia has explored the
more ambiguous meanings of republicanism. After all, the Latin original of the
term ‘republic’ - *res publica* - and its Scots vernacular translation,
‘commonweal’,\(^8\) have a wide range of connotations and do not carry the same re-
ductive set of connotations associated today with republicanism. The poet Edwin
Morgan (1920-2010), Scotland’s national Makar between 2004 and his death, ex-
ploited the multiple associations of the term ‘Respublica Scotorum’ in his poem
‘The Coin’, where his ideal of a ‘Respublica Scotorum’ (ambiguously a Latinized
version of the state, or republic, of the Scots), which appealed to Morgan’s osten-
sible republicanism,\(^3\) is referred to later in the sonnet as a ‘realm’ (which is usually
a synonym for kingdom, but also calls to mind ‘the community of the realm’,
under whose auspices Scots waged their medieval War of Independence):\(^4\)

We brushed the dirt off, held it to the light.
The obverse showed us *Scotland*, and the head

\(^8\) R. Mason, *Kingship and the commonweal: political thought in Renaissance and Reformation Scot-

\(^3\) Crawford, *Bannockburns*, p. 188.

\(^4\) See the most influential work of Scottish academic historiography, G.W.S. Barrow, *Robert Bruce
of a red deer; the antler-glint had fled
but the fine cut could still be felt. All right:
we turned it over, read easily One Pound,
but then the shock of Latin, like a gloss,
Respublica Scotorum, sent across
such ages as we guessed but never found
at the worn edge where once the date had been
and where as many fingers had gripped hard
as hopes their silent race had lost or gained.
The marshy scurf crept up to our machine,
sucked at our boots. Yet nothing seemed ill-starred.
And least of all the realm the coin contained. 85

In a similar vein, in his Saltoun Lecture of 1986, entitled ‘Republicanism, Fletcher
and Ferguson’, Professor Sir Neil MacCormick (1941-2009), the son of John Mac-
Cormick, attempted to recover the meanings of republicanism in the age of An-
drew Fletcher of Saltoun (in whose memory the annual Saltoun lecture was estab-
lished) and Adam Ferguson. In the eighteenth century classical republican ideas,
MacCormick argued, had at their core not the precise idea of non-monarchical
government, which underpins modern republican ideology, but the ideal of com-
munal self-governance by way of some form of constitution, which might, or might
not, include some monarchical element. ‘We do well to be reminded,’ MacCormick
announced, ‘that republicanism in the relevant sense does not preclude the possi-
bility of favouring a hereditary headship of state.’ 86

85 Edwin Morgan, Sonnets from Scotland (Glasgow, 1984), ‘The Coin’, p. 52.
(Saltire Society, Edinburgh, 2003), pp. 31-9, at p. 34.
On the other hand, this squeamishness on the subject of monarchy is all-too-typical of political values in England, and perhaps in Great Britain more generally. The absence of a mainstream republican movement is one of the obsessive features of the in-house debate within the New Left over what E.P. Thompson - an insular champion of the rough ‘vernacular of English radicalism’ and suspicious of modish French theory - termed ‘the peculiarities of the English’. Thompson’s opponents, Perry Anderson and, at greater length, Tom Nairn, the Scots Marxist-nationalist, have argued that England’s prematurely pre-democratic seventeenth-century revolutions and avoidance of a properly modern revolution of the French type produced in consequence various deformations in its history. These included a pragmatic and un-ideological acceptance of an evolving Whiggish regime based upon a non-absolutist monarchy and a less obviously oppressive post-feudal aristocracy. Its remarkable industrial development notwithstanding, British modernity, according to Nairn, was something of a mirage: at bottom it was a modified form of early modernity. By virtue of the Union of 1707, which became, in effect, a crucial component of the Whig settlement of 1688, Scotland too participated in this eccentric detour from the European norms of modernization and democratization. In this sense, the absence of a significant and established republican party in

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modern Scotland is a British ‘peculiarity’ which the Scots share with the English. Nevertheless, it would be an error to assume that the trajectory of post-Union Scotland simply followed that of the English nation, in which it was largely (but not entirely) incorporated in 1707, with no diversions of its own. In particular, the compressed rapidity and ensuing dislocation of agrarian change - most spectacularly, in the nineteenth-century Highlands - together with the perceived rigidity of Scottish feudal law, provoked in Scotland an enduring anti-landlord sentiment grounded in a coherent anti-feudalist ideology, which enjoyed a greater salience and tenacity in Scottish political culture than south of the border.\textsuperscript{91} Classic works in this idiom, such as Tom Johnston’s \textit{Our Scots Noble Families} (1909), focussed almost exclusively upon landownership not upon the crown at the apex of the feudal hierarchy.

Nevertheless, displacement of this sort does not mean that anti-monarchism, however unexpectedly invisible in radical circles, was non-existent. Frank Prochaska has identified a category of ‘theoretical republicans’ in British politics: those who favour republican outcomes often perceive other priorities as more pressing or republicanism as an impractical dream, and turn rather to these other priorities and suppress their republican preferences in the hope of effecting more immediately realisable goals.\textsuperscript{92} Theoretical republicanism of this sort has clearly played a part in the recent history of the SNP and its delicate triangulations on the question of monarchy. Nevertheless, there are also indigenous factors - distinctive


to Scotland - which dictate Scotland's own estrangement, or perhaps only semi-estrangement, from outright republicanism. These include, most obviously, Jacobitism and the supposed legacy of the Scottish Wars of Independence fought on behalf of an independent Scottish monarchy seemingly limited - and simultaneously strengthened in its campaign - by popular sovereignty. The SNP’s championship of the title ‘Queen of Scots’\(^\text{93}\) rather than ‘Queen of Scotland’ for the county’s future head of state is a way of intimating that in an independent Scotland its constitutional monarchy will be quasi-republican and narrowly constrained by popular sovereignty; a light-touch Louis Philippe-style monarchy, as it were, rather than a heavy-handed Bourbon version.

Yet aligning Scottish and English political cultures and identifying the common characteristics of both are not the same as conflating them. There are, however, other peculiarities of the Scottish experience which stand at some considerable remove from English political culture. Most obviously, there is the curious co-existence - sometimes even in the works of the same propagandist - of Jacobitism and republicanism. The curious persistence of Jacobitism in Scottish political rhetoric, sometimes indeed entangled with republicanism, serves as a reminder that, notwithstanding what they share in common, Scottish political values are not simply reducible to offshoots of a dominant English culture. Scottish political culture draws upon a deep indigenous history as well as from a shared well of British values.

\(^{93}\) See e.g. Salmond’s invocation of ‘the Queen of Scots’ at the time of Queen’s diamond jubilee in 2012: [http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jun/05/diamond-jubilee-salmond-scottish-celebrations](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jun/05/diamond-jubilee-salmond-scottish-celebrations).
Indeed, there is a very minor postscript to this story, which is utterly without parallel on the English political scene. Scottish Jacobitism has experienced a succession of afterlives in the centuries after the cause it served was effectively extinguished at Culloden. Yet none of its afterlives - even Jacobite-inflected Communism - has been quite so bizarre as the emergence of the latest Jacobite Pretender, HRH Prince Michael Stewart, 7th Count of Albany. To be more precise, Michael of Albany is not so much a traditional Stuart Pretender as he is a Jacobite Lambert Simnel. Prince Michael is a Belgian by origin, born in 1958 as Michel Lafosse. His story is that Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender, secretly obtained papal annulment of his marriage to Princess Louise of Stolberg, and that Bonnie Prince Charlie subsequently contracted a secret marriage to Marguerite de Lussan, the Comtesse de Massillon, from whom Lafosse traces his descent. Lafosse has set out his claim in *The Forgotten Monarchy of Scotland* (1988), which also contains a Jacobite-nationalist interpretation of Scottish history. Lafosse recognises the republican element in the Scottish nationalist tradition, but would prefer a non-republican solution to the Scottish Question: a constitutional monarchy under the true Jacobite line of succession. 94

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