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ABSTRACT
In the past twenty years, transnationalism has emerged as a concept to describe new immigrant identities and communities in a globalised world. International scholars of migration have begun to recognise the importance of transnationalism in explaining and understanding contemporary international migration flows, new immigrant identities and communities. This paper reviews the extant literature on the growth of transnationalism as first an American, then an Asian-Pacific, UK and European paradigm alongside assimilation, immigration and migration and assesses the (more focused) research that has begun to examine the degrees and levels of transnationalism amongst the ‘next-generations’- the 1.5-, second- and third-generation - with particular reference to the British Black Caribbean community. Whilst research on second-generation return migration to the Caribbean from the UK has identified transnational practices among a cohort of individuals, there is considerable scope for further research examining transnational practices, inter-generational transfers and intention to return among the 1.5-, second- and third-generation Black Caribbean community in situ in the UK.

INTRODUCTION
As globalisation becomes more entrenched and as advances in the fields of communication and transport move into the mainstream, activities, communities and daily lives have become more widely dispersed and linked across borders and between nation-states. Over the past twenty years, scholars of international migration have increasingly recognised that international migrants maintain links and ties with their countries of origin, and in some cases, belong to transnational communities. As immigrants engage in more frequent travel to, and from, their receiving country to their country of origin, ideas, cultures and ways of life have been transferred and transformed across borders. International migration scholars have embraced the concept of ‘transnationalism’ to describe what may be considered as new immigrant identities and communities, engaging in practices that had not taken place in earlier times (Foner, 1998, 2001; Goulbourne, 2001; Kivisto, 2001; Levitt and Waters, 2002; Portes, 1996; Portes et al 1999; Vertovec, 1999, 2001, 2004). Over the past decade, the concept of transnationalism has crossed over into a number of disciplines, picking up a number of
meanings, processes and criticisms along the way. As the concept of transnationalism continues to grow and strengthen, its empirical base has widened across Northern America, Europe and Asia. It has generated much interest and excitement as a research topic - there is now a growing corpus of literature on transnationalism by anthropologists, geographers, political scientists, sociologists, and others - and has entered the policy framework debate.

During the early 1970s, scholars in the field of international relations coined the term ‘transnationalism’ to describe the growth of non-state institutions and governance regimes acting across national boundaries (Levitt and Waters, 2002). Following on from this early definition of transnationalism, the term was subsequently adopted and theorised by a group of cultural anthropologists led by Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Blanc-Szanton, and Linda Basch, who identified transnational practices among US-destined immigrants. For them, transnationalism was a new way of understanding contemporary migration. According to Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994: 6) transnationalism was “a process by which transmigrants, through their daily activities, forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic, and political relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement, and through which they create transnational social fields that cross national borders”. For Basch and colleagues, these new immigrants were different from the later nineteenth and early twentieth century immigrants. Whilst these earlier immigrants generally broke away from their homeland societies and embraced the social and economic practices of their receiving country, today’s immigrants were fundamentally different; rather than sever links with their ancestral homeland they built and maintained links with both their county of origin and their country of settlement (Basch et al, 1994). Two new terms, ‘transnationalism’ and ‘transmigrants’ were introduced to characterise this new migration trend and the associated migrants.

Earlier research on international migration had been dominated by an assimilation framework which suggested that once migrants settled into their new host countries, they would generally sever links with their countries of origin. It was assumed that immigrants would ‘assimilate’ into their received countries (Warner, 1945; Gordon,
As early as the 1920s, assimilation had been described as “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life” (Park and Burgess, 1969: 735). Over the years, assimilation has been thoroughly critiqued as a theory, acquiring many different interpretations and re-interpretations (Brown and Bean, 2006). Its place and use in understanding migration, immigrants and their descendants is still a matter of debate (Alba 2005).

Broadly speaking, assimilationalist theories predicted that immigrants would steadily learn, absorb and adopt the language, culture, values and behavioural patterns of the receiving society and reject those of the homeland. It has been argued that if immigrants were to advance in socio-economic terms in their new receiving country, assimilation had to occur (Alba and Nee, 1997). This pairing of assimilation and socio-economic advancement has dominated the North American perspective on second-generation integration and upward mobility. However, the concept has attracted increased criticism in Europe. Scholars have argued that the concept of assimilation is largely derived from a North American perspective based on an American experience during an earlier era of mass immigration, and therefore its applicability to the experience of immigrants in mainland Europe today is questionable. In the UK, one of its latest versions - segmented assimilation theory - has never really held sway. Instead, scholars have tended to concentrate their writings around the ideas of ‘hybridity’ and ‘creolization’ and “syncretic cultures bringing together white and black” (Foner, 2005: 126). As a result of this criticism, ‘transnationalism’ has now been put forward as a more appropriate way of understanding contemporary migration and even as a substitute for assimilation. However, for some scholars such as Kivisto (2001: 571) transnationalism should not be viewed as an alternative to assimilation, but rather “as one possible variant of assimilation”, as transnational immigrants are working to maintain homeland connections and at the same time engaging in the process of acculturating to the host society.
If the two are amalgamated - assimilation and transnationalism – there are reasons to doubt whether assimilation actually occurs among all first-generation immigrants. How successful is integration for the immigrants who settle at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder? For those who are subjected to discrimination due to skin colour or cultural characteristics and differences, will there always be barriers to successful integration in their received countries? Do all or even a majority of immigrants sever their links with their country of origin and assimilate? What about the children of these immigrants? How successful have they been in terms of assimilation? In recent times, such barriers to integration and assimilation have been recognised in line with the view that international migration can no longer be viewed as a one-way process (Levitt and Waters, 2002).

The growing body of studies on transnationalism has been described by Vertovec (1999: 448) as dealing with “variegated phenomena” with studies on “transnational ... communities, capital flows, trade, citizenship, corporations, inter-governmental agencies, non-governmental organisations, politics, services, social movements, social networks, families, migration circuits, identities, public spaces, public cultures”. One result of this growing body of work is ‘conceptual muddling’ according to Vertovec (1999: 448). He identifies six themes as a means of understanding the term transnationalism, i.e. as a social morphology, a type of consciousness, a mode of cultural reproduction, an avenue of capital, a site of political engagement, and as a reconstruction of ‘place’ or locality. Vertovec (1999) suggests that transnationalism does not only refer to social space but also to consciousness, which suggests that if groups are transnational in social spaces they must therefore possess a transnational consciousness.

For some, transnationalism remains a controversial subject. Certain scholars argue that transnationalism is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Many argue that transnationalism has existed for centuries and that there is nothing novel or new about contemporary transnational practices (Waldinger, 1998). Return migration and visits to home communities have always taken place. Cohen (1987) argues that regular contact with societies of origin has always existed in certain diasporas, where nationals have been
forced to settle in a number of different cultures. At the turn of the twentieth century, Polish, Italian and Russian immigrants were engaging in activities that could now be identified as transnational practices, linking together their societies of origin and settlement. These immigrants, having invested in land and businesses back in their country of origin, made regular trips back home to visit their families and engage in political causes (Foner, 1997). However, it is important to emphasize that whilst these activities and regular contacts have always existed among immigrants across national boundaries, which in turn have reinforced bonds between communities, they have not necessarily been characterised by transnationalism as we know it today. The advent of globalisation and improved technology and communication in the form of air travel, internet and e-mail has allowed for more regular and sustained forms of transnationalism on a different scale and with a different scope.

For Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999: 221-225), who argue for a very clear cut definition of transnationalism, one which requires activities to have “regularity, routine involvement and critical mass” with immigrants actually living in, or between, two countries, migration movement or migrant practices are either transnational or not. In their opinion there are three types of transnationalism: (1) economic, (2) political and (3) socio-cultural, all requiring sustained and regular long-term contact across borders to be truly transnational. Whilst Guarnizo (2001: 214) concedes that transnational practices and political activity are not new phenomena, he acknowledges that the situation is complicated by the fact that today, migrants are no longer forced to forsake their original citizenship. The emergence and acceptance of dual citizenship by most sending and host countries has allowed migrants to be “formally incorporated both ‘here’ and ‘there’”. Participation in the affairs of two or more nation states that is actively encouraged by both sets of governments is just one facet of contemporary transnational practices. Although Portes et al (1999) insist that transnationalism should be regular and sustained, with long term contact, Levitt (2002) prefers to envisage a broad continuum of ‘transnational practices’ in which individuals may at any time engage, rather than an all-encompassing transnational ‘condition of being’.
Notwithstanding the definitional problem associated with the term transnationalism, it is still an important idea characterising international migration in a globalised world. Due to the hybrid nature of British society in post-colonial times, the discourse of assimilation and the narrow definitions of transnationalism which have emerged from this discourse seem of limited use when applied to the experience of immigrants to the UK, especially the second- and third-generation groups. A broader definition of transnationalism along the lines propounded in Vertovec’s work which emphasises the ‘variegated phenomena’ that constitute transnationalism alongside its ‘conceptual muddling’ would be more useful in furthering an understanding of the identity formation, experiences and global ties to the ancestral home of first-, one and a half-, second- and third-generation groups. This transnational perspective can usefully complement the new insights on the second-generation British-Caribbean community in situ in the UK provided by Goulbourne (1990), Goulbourne and Chamberlain (2001) and Reynolds (2006).

TRANSNATIONALISM AND THE SECOND-GENERATION
In the past decade there has been a growing academic interest in second-generation migrants. A number of studies have been undertaken on the children of immigrants who were born in the United States, particularly US-born children of Mexican and Asian first-generation immigrants and those who came to the country when they were young and were raised and educated in the United States (the so-called ‘1.5-generation’) (Kasinitz et al, 2004; Levitt and Waters, 2002). More recently there has been a growing interest in the European second-generation (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; Thomson and Crul, 2007; Wessendorf, 2007). Over the past fifteen years, most research on the second-generation had been approached from a framework of assimilation and integration (Farley and Alba, 2002; Kasinitz et al, 2004; Thomson and Crul, 2007). Since it was assumed that immigrants would eventually assimilate into their host country, it was considered only natural that the children of these first-generation immigrants would also assimilate into their county of birth. Early American research on the second-generation proceeded from the assumption that children of immigrants would assimilate, or be characterised by
stronger attachments to their family’s adopted homeland than to their parents’ ancestral homeland and would thus not demonstrate transnational practices.

The early second-generation research was dominated by US scholars and focused on youthful second-generation immigrant experiences in the US, with the result that the theoretical models used to explain the behavioural responses of the second-generation proceed from a North American perspective (Levi and Waters 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Portes 2001, Vickerman, 1999). These models have been generalised as cross-culturally valid, failing to take into account the ‘exceptionalism’ of America’s stratified and segregated society that has long been divided by racism. Gans (1992) put forward the concept of ‘second-generation decline’, arguing that second-generation immigrants have poor economic opportunities, are restricted in their access to good schools, education and jobs, and therefore experience downward mobility relative to their own parents’ mobility. As an alternative, Portes and Zhou (1993) suggested a theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ which describes a number of possible outcomes for second-generation groups in their adaptation to American society. The first outcome involves members of the second-generation acculturating, thereby facilitating their integration into the white middle-class. The second outcome predicts the downward mobility of the second-generation into permanent poverty and subsequent membership of the ‘underclass’ whilst the third outcome centres on rapid economic growth for the second-generation through the safeguarding of immigrant community values, morals and ethics. Portes and Zhou (1993) argue that the level of incorporation for the first-generation results in different types of opportunities, social networks, cultural and social capital for the second-generation. For Portes and Zhou (1993) the second-generation groups who have the best economic opportunities for upward mobility are the groups who resist acculturation. Those groups who do not resist acculturation have a strong possibility of experiencing downward assimilation and joining the urban underclass.

Recent studies of the European second-generation offer an alternative view to the established US-based research and theories on the second-generation. Firstly, as Thomson and Crul (2007) argue, the American-centric debate on the integration of the
second-generation has largely concentrated on comparing different ethnic groups in the same national context. There have been only a limited number of studies comparing the integration of children of immigrants in America and in other countries. As Thomson and Crul (2007) point out, it is only recently that North American research has started to look at the importance of ‘national context’, in which immigrants and their children live and work, whereas in Europe, ‘national context’ has received more attention. For them, this European contribution of ‘national context’ is an important factor in the integration of the second-generation and has consequently contributed to the international theoretical debate on integration. Second-generation European groups are also ethnically very different to those in the US, and differ significantly in terms of their migration and settlement patterns - in Europe the parents of the largest second-generation groups tend to have migrated from ex-colonies or were recruited as labour migrants (Thomson and Crul, 2007).

American ideas of ‘downward assimilation’ and ‘segmented assimilation’ are not necessarily applicable to the European and UK second-generation population. Studies on educational performance among different ethnic groups show that the children of Indian and Chinese immigrants have consistently out performed British white groups at school (Gillborn and Gipps, 1996, Gillborn and Mirza, 2000). However, this appears not to be the case for Afro-Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils in the UK who do not perform as well as their British White and British Chinese and Indian counterparts. In the words of Gillborn and Mirza (2000: 12): “African-Caribbean, Pakistani and Bangladeshi pupils are markedly less likely to attain five higher grade GCSEs than their White and Indian peers nationally”. Many explanations for this poor performance have been suggested, one being that teachers have lower expectations of Afro-Caribbean pupils’ academic ability. Other explanations have been put forward to explain poor performance, such as a lack of black role models in schools, a lack of culturally-relevant subjects in the school curriculum, a lack of parental involvement and “the fact that so many black boys are brought up in fatherless families, which deprives them of other masculine role models” and an “anti-education culture” in the black Caribbean community (Sewell, 2002). One overriding theme in this comparative debate on second-
generation, educational performances is institutional racism and racist school practices in the UK (Wright, 1988, Sewell, 1997, Blaire, 2001). For Sewell (1997) black Caribbean boys experience pressure from their peers to adopt the norms of an ‘urban’ or ‘street’ sub-culture, thereby according more prestige to disruptive behaviour towards teachers than on academic achievement. Exclusion and expulsion figures also show that black Caribbean and mixed groups are the only ethnic groups over-represented relative to white British pupils in those excluded from school (Strand, 2007). It is evident that there is a wide range of explanations for educational performance across the different ethnic groups, though which one carries most weight is a matter of debate. What is clear is that an American theory of ‘downward assimilation’ is dependent on a set of American economic and social structural features which do not necessarily feature, extend or cross over into the UK and mainland Europe.

Recently, some scholars have begun to look beyond assimilationist arguments to consider the significance of transnationalism in the second-generation’s experiences. While some scholars maintain that transnationalism is a temporary phenomenon that will disappear as the second- and third- generations assimilate into the home country (Kivisto, 2001), others suggest that transnationalism will carry over and continue for several generations (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, Levitt, 2003). Earlier studies on assimilation and the incorporation of the second-generation into society had neglected to take into consideration that some children of first-generation migrants have strong links and ties to their parents’ ancestral homeland (Levitt and Waters, 2002). More recent research supports the idea that transnationalism is ‘alive and well’ among second-generation groups, and in more than a few cases has resulted in a number of second-generation individuals migrating to their parent(s) country of origin (Potter, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Potter and Philips, 2006a, 2006b, Christou, 2006, Lee-Cunin, 2005, and Wessendorf, 2007). However, it is fair to say that whilst some second-generation people exhibit many transnational practices, others exhibit very few transnational habits and practices.
What accounts for these differences? There are a number of factors which lead to, and influence, the transnational activities of members of the second-generation, such as race, gender, class and life-course, the socio-economic status of parents, parental links to the ancestral homeland, pressures on children to engage and integrate in transnational practices and the importance given to the ancestral homeland and keeping in touch with family. The experiences of the second-generation in the wider society will also have a bearing on the degrees of transnationality they exhibit (Morawska, 2003).

If transnational migration is more than just a first-generation phenomenon, how transnational then are the children of the first-generation immigrants? Do the second-generation experience different forms and levels of transnationalism to the first-generation? Are cultural and permanent links to the ancestral homeland more important for the second-generation than economic and political ties, which may be more important for the first generation? If indeed the second-generation engage in transnational practices, do they vary over time and between groups at different life stages? Do second-generation groups possess a transnational consciousness?

One important area to examine in relation to the levels and strength of transnationalism among the next generations, is that of life-course stage (Levitt 2002). As Levitt (2002) suggests, transnationalism and transnational activities do not remain constant across the life-course, or life cycle1. Depending on where the individual is at their life-course stage, in terms of family, work and transnational practices, strategies and identities can ebb and flow; these can become much deeper and meaningful with age and experience, for instance. Factors such as work, marriage, children, family all influence the level of transnationalism across the life-course stage.

Within Caribbean transnational communities and families (Chamberlain, 1998 and 2006; Conway, 2007; Fog Olwig, 2001 and 2002; Goulbourne and Chamberlain, 2001; Ho, 1993) transnational experiences deepen and become more resilient and influential with age, experience and network strengthening. Extended family connections and relations serve as social support systems to members of transnational family
networks in the multi-local diaspora and at home. Within such family networks, inter-generational bonds develop between migrants and parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins. Thus, migrants rely upon such bonds to support and influence their cross-border mobility, build relationships with siblings, selectively drop ties and re-engage with long lost distant kin and family members (Carnegie, 1982; Conway, 1986 and 1988).

In this context of transnationalism, assimilation and the second-generation, it is interesting to look at ‘home’ and ‘identity’ for the second-generation. Where is ‘home’ for the second-generation? Do strong transnational practices among second-generation individuals result in an ethnic identification with their parents’ country of origin? Does this in turn motivate ‘return’ to the ancestral homeland? What motivates second-generation people to migrate to the parents’ country of origin? Finally, it is important to ask whether transnationalism among the 1.5-, second- and third-generations varies among different ethnic groups. Are some groups and localities inherently more transnational than others? How transnational is the second- and third-generation British Black Caribbean community in the UK?

SECOND-GENERATION ‘RETURN’ MIGRATION WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SECOND-GENERATION CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY

As research on the second-generation has been recent and dominated by an American framework and interpretation, the phenomenon of second-generation people migrating to their parents’ country of origin has received scant attention. Indeed, migration to the parents’ country of origin was largely overlooked as research focused mainly on first-generation return migration. Recently, however, there have been several studies on second-generation transnationalism and how children relate to their parents’ ancestral homeland. There is a growing body of literature on second-generation ‘return’ migration to the parents’ country of origin, notably Caribbeans from Britain (Lee-Cunnin, 2005, Potter, 2001, 2005a and 2005b; Potter and Philips, 2006a, 2006b), Greeks from North America (Christou, 2006), and Swiss-Italians from Switzerland (Wessendorf, 2007).
In some instances these second-generation ‘returning migrants’ possess dual citizenship/nationality, hold two passports, and maintain links with their country of origin and with their country of residence, as shown by research among young returning Trinidadians (Conway, Potter and St Bernard, 2008). The recent growth of research on transnationalism has proceeded hand in hand with a rise in the number of dual- or multiple-nationalities across the globe. Across the globe, millions possess two or more passports and live in more than one country. Dual-citizenship or dual-nationality can be claimed through a number of avenues: birth, marriage, ancestral lineage or through naturalisation (Vertovec, 2004). Pre-globalisation, dual-nationality/citizenship was often seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state, an attitude that still persists in some parts of the world today. Dual and multiple-nationalities seemed to undermine the assumption that each person belonged to just one country and as a citizen owed exclusive loyalty to that country alone. However, the idea that people will automatically belong to just one nation-state has lost currency in recent years, in part due to the impact of global trends such as the erosion of the authority of the nation-state caused by economic globalisation, the changes in the make-up of national populations caused by sustained global flows of conflict refugees and economic migrants, and the drive towards freedom of movement of workers across ‘borderless’ neighbour states. As Castles and Davidson (2000: 87) succinctly state: “Dual citizenship seems an appropriate way of managing the multiple identities that arise from globalisation, especially as more and more people actually live in more than one country”.

Prior to the 1980s, receiving countries may have insisted on loyalty, and to some extent, assimilation and incorporation into, and adoption of the identity of the new homeland. However, in recent times, countries have begun to recognise that transnationalism and dual-nationality are not necessarily a threat to sovereignty, and that poignantly for some immigrants, it is impossible to sever all links and forget your country of origin and assimilate. As Vertovec (1999: 455) notes “around half the world’s countries recognise dual citizenship or dual nationality”. In many cases, governments are increasingly aware of the benefits of their citizens leaving their country to work and live in another country; migrant remittances are now a significant source of revenue for many
developing economies. In 1994, migrants transferred at least $75 billion world-wide in remittances (Martin, 1994).

Despite political resistance from some countries towards dual citizenship/nationality, there has been a rise in the incidences and impact of dual citizenship/nationality globally. How many second-generation Caribbeans in Britain hold dual nationality? Has this been premised on economic grounds, as a result of parental influence, out of a desire to participate in the political life of both countries, or for cultural or emotional reasons? Does dual-nationality go hand in hand with an intention to ‘return’ at some stage of the life-course?

So what motivates the children of first-generation immigrants to move and relocate to their parents’ country of origin, even though they had not been born or raised there? A number of explanations have been given for second-generation return, including the intention to return and Anwar’s (1979) ‘myth of return’ being passed on from parents to their offspring. Coupled with regular return visits to the ancestral homeland from a young age, regular and sustained contact with remaining family members via e-mail, internet and phone have all acted as motivators for return migration. Duval’s (2004) research examined the link between return visits and return migration using ethnographic data obtained through field work among members of the Commonwealth Eastern Caribbean community in Toronto, Canada in 2001-2002. He investigated whether or not the return visit as a transnational exercise would bridge identities, and facilitate or maintain return migration. Duval suggests that the link between the return visit and return migration is firstly a decision to express and reaffirm social ties. Secondly, the return visit allows migrants to measure the changes in their ancestral homeland, which in turn can be helpful if migrants are deciding to return. Lastly, Duval (2004: 63) suggests that the return visit allows migrants to position themselves within a wider social context; by this he means that by “maintaining visibility, migrants who return permanently are in a better position to reintegrate socially”. He argues that return visits allow migrants to maintain identities in their current place of location and that of their homeland. For Duval, these regular return visits back home
allow migrants to maintain links with their ancestral homeland, which in turn aids their return home and social integration.

Stephenson’s (2002) paper looking at the first- and second-generation Caribbean community in Moss Side, Manchester, identifies and examines the socio-cultural meanings associated with travelling to the ancestral homeland in the Caribbean from the perspective of tourism. His ethnographic study of the Caribbean community considers the personal meaning which members of the first- and second-generation community attach to visiting the ancestral homeland. Stephenson defines this form of travel as “ethnic reunion”, which for him “allows members of culturally displaced communities to renew or reconstruct a personal association with the ancestral homeland” (Stephenson, 2002: 416). He argues that first- and second-generation individuals participate in the “homeland experience”, and as a result, reconstruct a self-identity through their travel perceptions and experiences. Stephenson (2002: 397) believes that primary motivators for travel “relate to the need to fulfil family obligations and to satisfy cultural expectations”. He suggests that mothers and grandmothers influence perceptions of the ancestral homeland, by transmitting island knowledge and teaching offspring about their culture and heritage, thus transmitting a sense of belonging to a particular destination: “memories, knowledge of particular places and travel experiences help to verify an individual’s identification with the ancestral homeland” (Stephenson, 2002: 402). This analysis of inter-generational transfer of island knowledge, culture and heritage is salient, as it suggests that transnationalism is passed from generation to generation, and that it does not disappear or grow weaker with the second-generation. The art of travelling to one’s ancestral homeland suggests that for a cohort of second-generation Caribbean individuals in the UK, transnational practices are alive and strong. Whilst, these individuals may only be visiting the ancestral homeland for a holiday rather than ‘returning’ for good, it suggests that these individuals possess multiple identities which they have developed through their childhood, which now refer to more than one place or nation-state.
From the 1960s onwards, research has focused on the first- and older Caribbean generation of emigrants to the UK, namely, the ‘Windrush generation’. It explored this generation’s position in the UK, the sending of remittances to the Caribbean and in the later stages, those who have decided to ‘return’ to the Caribbean. Since the late 1970s researchers have documented return migration to the Caribbean with much attention on returning nationals of retirement age, focusing on their social, economic and behavioural adjustments upon arrival (Gmelch, 1985; Byron and Condon, 1996; Thomas-Hope, 1985).

Earlier research had highlighted the trend for first-generation Caribbean migrants to hold on to the belief that one day they would return ‘home’ and live in the house they had build with remittances they had sent back over the years. According to John (1972) this long held belief among the first-generation became a “useful psychological game” as many first-generation immigrants knew and admitted to themselves that they would never return. According to John (1972) this long cherished notion of returning home was unlikely to be held by the second-generation whom he believed were here to stay, whether or not they were born in the UK. This view was also shared by Midgett (1975: 76) who believed that generational differences between the first- and second-generations made it highly unlikely that the second-generation would ever consider returning to the Caribbean as “culturally they have very little to distinguish them from any other black children in London. They cannot speak patois, the language of their parents; they have no recollection of an island or village home; and they even reject the cuisine of their parents in favour of fish and chips”.

Although, this earlier research on the black Caribbean community in the 1970s tended to view return to the Caribbean as a first-generation phenomenon, recent research has shown that second-generation return migration is a facet of life for a small cohort of individuals. Research in the early 2000s identified a relatively new migration stream to the Caribbean region which until quite recently had remained largely unseen and understudied – the movement of comparatively young second-generation returning nationals to the Caribbean. Thus, Potter (Potter, 2001, 2005a, 2005b; Potter and Phillips,
2006a and 2006b) on research trips to the eastern Caribbean met a growing number of second-generation returning nationals. It transpired that this group of young people who are second- and third-generation West Indians, born in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada or elsewhere, to first-generation West Indian immigrants, had decided to ‘return’ to the countries of their parents, for various reasons. Consequently, detailed research based on young returnees was conducted in Barbados (51 informants) and St Lucia (15 informants) from 1999 to 2000 (Potter, 2001, 2005a). Research concentrated on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of these young returnees, their pattern of visits to the island prior to migration and the reasons for their move, the adjustments made by the returnees and the ‘hybrid’ and ‘in-between’ positionalities of these transnational migrants.

This essential ‘inbetweeness’ and hybridity of migrant identities is a central tenet of post-colonial theories of identity (Chamberlain, 1998). However, post-colonial writings have tended to overlook the return experiences of migrants to their post-colonial origins, and the ways in which expanded economic relations, and transnational and transcontinental labour market flows have contributed to the emergence of new hybrid identities (Lloyd-Evans and Bowlby, 2000). Consequently, they have failed to recognise the importance of transnational connections, crossings and tensions between Africa, the Caribbean, America and Britain (Gilroy, 1993). As a result, little is known about return adjustment, negotiation patterns and hybrid identities connected with post-colonial return. Following Potter’s initial research in the late 1990s and early 2000, a number of working hypotheses concerning the adaptation experiences of these young returnees were developed, which in turn became the focus for a major study of second-generation young returnees to the region (Potter and Philips, 2006a and 2006b).
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How and why do second-generation Caribbeans maintain and sustain transnational ties? Do they live in transnational social spaces and to what extent do they possess a transnational consciousness? Are there differences between ethnic Caribbean groups regarding participation in transnational activities? Do second-generation Caribbean people possess multiple ethnic identities and a Caribbean identity? Is this influenced by level of educational attainment, life-course stage, socio-economic position, self-identity and ethnic awareness, parental influence and links to the Caribbean? What motivates a small cohort of the second-generation to return to the Caribbean, while the majority do not?

The UK Caribbean community is far from being homogeneous; it is diverse, including migrants from a number of Caribbean islands (including Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, St Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago) and their descendents. Migration from the Caribbean to Britain from the 1940s onwards was primarily undertaken for socio-economic reasons. Caribbean migrants were attracted by employment in factories and service sector industries and government-sponsored recruitment (Peach, 1991). One of the first countries to be affected by out-migration was Jamaica. By 1948, some 547 Jamaicans had emigrated to the UK (Glass, 1960). Migration from the Caribbean to the UK continued during the 1950s, as the UK struggled with a post-war labour shortage. However, by 1962, migration from the Caribbean to the UK had significantly dropped due to the highly-restrictive legislation on Commonwealth Immigrants which came into effect in that year (Peach, 1968). Indeed, the number of people actually born in the Caribbean and living in Great Britain peaked in the mid-1960s, so that by 1973 mass migration from the Caribbean to Britain was effectively over (Peach, 1991).
At the start of the 1990s, the Caribbean-born population was 264,591, indicating a decline in the Caribbean-born population which was a result of mortality and to a certain degree return migration to the Caribbean (Peach, 1991). However, when the UK-born children of these Caribbean immigrants are included, the Caribbean population of Great Britain stood at 678,365 in 1991, amounting to 1.2 per cent of the total population (Owen, 2001). It is important to note that the 1991 UK Census only covered around 98 per cent of the population, resulting in an underestimate of 1.2 million people. Therefore, it has been estimated that the Caribbean population is nearly 4 per cent larger than the census figure (Owen, 2001). The structure of this Caribbean population in 1991 clearly showed three generations - the original post-war immigrants, who had reached late middle-age in 1991; their children, mainly born in the 1960s; and the grandchildren. The 1950s and 1960s second-generation was by far the largest; with the biggest age cohort being people aged 35 to 49. In 2001, 1.0 per cent (565,876) of the total UK population were Black Caribbean, making up 12.2 per cent of the minority ethnic population.

Table 1: Estimated size of the Black Caribbean Caribbean population in the UK, 1951-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>17,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>173,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>304,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>545,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>678,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>565,876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Office of Statistics
Table 2: Thirty local authorities in England and Wales with the largest Black Caribbean population, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Local Authority</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Birmingham</td>
<td>47,831</td>
<td>Lewisham</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lambeth</td>
<td>32,139</td>
<td>Lambeth</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lewisham</td>
<td>30,543</td>
<td>Brent</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Brent</td>
<td>27,574</td>
<td>Hackney</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Croydon</td>
<td>26,065</td>
<td>Haringey</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Hackney</td>
<td>20,879</td>
<td>Waltham Forest</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Haringey</td>
<td>20,570</td>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Southwark</td>
<td>19,555</td>
<td>Croydon</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Newham</td>
<td>17,931</td>
<td>Newham</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Waltham Forest</td>
<td>17,797</td>
<td>Enfield</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Enfield</td>
<td>14,590</td>
<td>Hammersmith &amp; Fulham</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ealing</td>
<td>13,507</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Wandsworth</td>
<td>12,665</td>
<td>Wandsworth</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Sandwell</td>
<td>9,403</td>
<td>Islington</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Nottingham UA</td>
<td>9,189</td>
<td>Ealing</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Redbridge</td>
<td>9,126</td>
<td>Luton UA</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Wolverhampton</td>
<td>9,116</td>
<td>Wolverhampton</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Manchester</td>
<td>9,044</td>
<td>Redbridge</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Islington</td>
<td>8,550</td>
<td>Merton</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Hammersmith &amp; Fulham</td>
<td>8,534</td>
<td>Nottingham UA</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Luton UA</td>
<td>7,653</td>
<td>Sandwell</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Merton</td>
<td>6,976</td>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Greenwich</td>
<td>6,755</td>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Leeds</td>
<td>6,718</td>
<td>Harrow</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Harrow</td>
<td>6,116</td>
<td>Slough UA</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Westminster</td>
<td>5,613</td>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As early as 1961, geographical patterns of Caribbean settlement had emerged and these have largely endured over the years. Demand for labour in Britain during the Second World War 1939-1945, had resulted in several thousand West Indians volunteering for the British armed services, and many were recruited to work in the Merseyside munitions factories (Peach, 1986). In the subsequent post-war period, other industries experienced shortages in particular areas. The upward mobility of the white population had left gaps in certain jobs that needed to be filled by a ‘replacement population’. British Rail, London Transport and the National Health Service recruited labour directly from Barbados. Indeed, the Barbadian government in 1955 set up a sponsorship scheme under which the British Transport Commission, the London Transport Executive, the British Hotels and Restaurants Association, and the Regional Hospital Boards received workers. One striking feature of this ‘replacement population’ has been its impact on the longstanding geographical distribution in the UK of the Caribbean community. London, the South-East, East and West Midlands, the West Riding of Yorkshire and later the North-West had high levels of Caribbean immigration (Peach, 1986 and 1991). Caribbean migrants tended to locate themselves in urban areas, with over 55 per cent of the Caribbean population living in Greater London and 13 per cent in the West Midlands. By 1991, nearly two-thirds of all Caribbeans in Britain lived in South East England. Caribbeans made up 5.6 per cent of the population of London. Black Caribbeans form more than 10 per cent of the population of the London Boroughs of Lewisham, Lambeth, Brent and Hackney (Office of National Statistics, 2001). Outside London, the next largest Caribbean population was in Birmingham (53,600) at 5.6 per cent of its total population and 7.9 per cent of all Caribbean people in Great Britain in 1991 (Owen, 2001).
Over the years, most research on black people of Caribbean descent in the UK has focused on a range of issues specific to this group and the subsequent responses from the black community and government. Early research on first- and second-generation Caribbean immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s concentrated on the integration of second-generation ‘black youth’ with particular reference to young blacks and employment, education, family life, racism and social problems. The socio-economic experience of young blacks in relation to policing, political alienation and homelessness were also areas of interest in early research (e.g. Patterson, 1969; Deakin, 1970; Cottle, 1978; Pryce, 1986, Solomos, 1988, Back, 1996).

Over the years, research has shown that black people of Caribbean descent were more likely than any other ethnic group to be stopped and searched under the controversial ‘Sus Law’. This law was deeply unpopular among young black men who
believed that it was abused by the police and thus they encountered higher incidences of police brutality. Research has also shown that black people of Caribbean descent were more likely to under-achieve and experience higher levels of unemployment. They were also over-represented in the prison system and had higher levels of poor mental and physical health (Goulborne, 2001). Commenting on the racial climate of the time, Goulbourne (1990: 6) opined that “although black people of all shades, cultural backgrounds, etc., have sought to participate in all aspects of the nation’s life, they do so against a background of majority white hostility, sanctioned by the state and justified on the basis of apparent racial or colour difference”.

As a direct result of various immigration and nationality laws, racism and perceptions of racism, especially in schooling and policing, high levels of youth unemployment, poor housing and the marginalisation of black Caribbean people in British society, a lasting legacy of suspicion has been created which directly affects the way in which black British and black Caribbean individuals deal with racism and interact with British society. It has, as Goulbourne (2001: 26) states, forced the British government to address these issues facing an ethnic minority in a “post-imperial society which claimed to be multi-cultural, fair and democratic”.

It can be argued that black people of Caribbean descent in the UK have experienced a unique set of circumstances that have in turn had an effect on how black people view themselves and how they respond to racism from the majority white host population. Although the Asian community and the black Caribbean community in the UK experienced racism, according to James (1993:260) “the ways in which both groups experience racism are not always identical”. For James, Asians tended to be subjected to ‘fascist terror’ whilst Afro-Caribbean individuals, especially youth, tended to be subjected to a greater degree of state harassment, police brutality, and the ‘Sus Laws’. James (1993:260) believes that the different experiences among the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities “have, not surprisingly, generated different responses and assessments of British racism and have spawned different priorities among the two major black nationalities”.

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Goulbourne (2001) argues that discussions of the problems faced by the Caribbean community in Britain are informed by generalised assumptions concerning their family life, kinship patterns, customs, practices and traditions. He highlights a unique set of circumstances surrounding Caribbean families in the UK. In the Caribbean it is normal practice for the extended family to play a role in the rearing of young children. Grandmothers, aunts, and other members of the extended family all helped out. However, in the UK, the extended family could not always be called upon to assist in child minding and rearing, and so many Caribbean mothers who had to work full-time were absent from the family home. This was seen as a contributory factor to the high proportion of children of Caribbean parents in care and single-parent families (Barn, 2001).

What impact has the experience of racism and these unique challenges faced by the Caribbean community had on the 1.5-, second- and third-generations of Caribbean descent living in the UK today? One observation not always factored into the equation is that over the past two decades, the political, social and economic climate in Britain has changed. Britain in the 21st century is very different to the Britain of the late 1970s, 1980s and even early- and mid-1990s. More than a decade of New Labour policies, particularly, the advance of multiculturalism, has shaped Britain in a way that arguably is more open to ethnic minorities, social cohesion and dual nationalism and identity. Has this had an effect on the black Caribbean community and particularly the second- and third-generation and how they see themselves in the UK and their links with the ancestral homeland? Do they feel accepted and at home in the UK? Do they feel that they belong?

More recent research on the Caribbean community in the UK has focused on young black people with particular reference to their youth sub-cultures, identity and cultural formations. Gunter’s (2004) ethnographic study of a young black East London neighbourhood examined the role and significance of contemporary youth sub-cultures on the transitions and everyday life experiences of primarily, but not exclusively, young black men. He explores agency, identity, cultural formation and hybridity in the lives of
black young men in East London, whilst linking in questions about the impact of economic restructuring and neo-liberal government policies on their local neighbourhoods, families and kinship networks. His study identifies two key sub-cultures which have strong impacts on the lives and post-16 transitions of his informants: the ‘Road Culture’ and the ‘Grafter Culture’. Gunter (2004) identifies ‘Road culture’ as black influenced youth sub-culture which informs young peoples’ speech styles, dress codes, musical preferences and general leisure choices. ‘Grafter Culture’ draws on white working-class East End masculinist traditions, distinguished by their positive attitude towards manual labour and paid employment.

Doswell’s (2001) study of young black youth born in Croydon to Caribbean-born parents and grandparents looked at the inter-generational tensions and difference in expectations and aspirations between them. Doswell was concerned with four issues; (i) whether young black people of Caribbean descent have different expectations of their potential educational and vocational achievements from those of their parents and grandparents; (ii) whether differences exist between the generations in life chances, social status and the individual’s sense of identity; (iii) what the key factors are which influence the choices young people make and the aspirations they hold; and (iv) whether their upbringing in Britain is different from that of their parents’ and/or grandparents’ generations to the extent that it causes cleavages in relationships.

Doswell’s findings confirmed that these young black people were more mobile than their parents and grandparents and demonstrated higher educational aspirations and social mobility: “Black young people aspire to higher qualifications and seek upward occupational, and thereby social, mobility compared to previous generations from the Caribbean” (Doswell, 2001: 240). Doswell (2001) also examined the possibility of ‘return migration’ to the Caribbean and asked young people and their parents and grandparents for their opinion and views of the Caribbean and the possibility of return. He suggests that young black people were ambivalent over what they perceived as their nationality and that their views of the Caribbean varied, some liking it more than others, whilst a few wanted to live there permanently. His respondents did not feel that they had
roots in the Caribbean, but at the same time they found it difficult to perceive themselves as being part of British society. Thus, Doswell, (2001: 244) comments on how “Black young people, born in Britain, are likely to feel disconnected from both the African-Caribbean community and unwelcome by the white community and thereby suffer a sense of cultural anomie. This is exacerbated by the racism inherent in society which denies them the opportunity to forge a necessary, new and distinctive identity as an emerging British black citizen”. He also argues that these young black youth are in “a no-man’s land”; they are what he terms a “lost generation”, who need to “acquire a totally new sense of identity, which is distinctive and yet appropriate for the new British black citizen” (Doswell, 2001: 243). Doswell goes on to suggest that because these young black people have aspirations for a higher social status than that of their parents and grandparents, and because of a loss of cultural transmission, they are apt to reject their parents’ and grandparents’ cultural patterns. Instead, they assimilate patterns more typical of the indigenous white population, thereby becoming disconnected culturally from both their parents and grandparents. Doswell (2001) argues that this cultural disconnect coupled with the racism inherent in society results in a narrowing of opportunities and frustrates acceptance into British society. Importantly, he suggests that British-born black young people suffer a sense of cultural anomie denying them a necessary, new and distinctive identity as emerging black British citizens.

Doswell’s (2001) study draws upon a relatively small sample (a total of 30 informants were interviewed) as he experienced problems accessing grandparents and parents. It is tempting to suggest that the study does not take into consideration the differences in the social, economic and political climate greeting today’s black youth compared to those which their parents and grandparents experienced. For many of these parents and grandparents who emigrated to Britain between the 1940s to the 1970s, Britain and British society was very different from the Britain of today and that of Doswell’s study. Access to better paid jobs and education were scarce and the priorities of newly arriving immigrants were different to the priorities and aspirations of their offspring born in the UK who would also have experienced a different educational
Neither does Doswell adequately define or explain what he means by “emerging British black citizens” and their place and position in British society today.

Other research on second- and third-generation young people of Caribbean descent in Britain is closely related to the concept of transnationalism and its impact on the lives of individuals. Reynolds (2006) suggests that second- and third-generation young people of Caribbean descent in Britain participate in transnational family and kinship events and celebrations, thus encouraging them to be part of a globally dispersed family. This participation influences their ethnic identity formation and re-affirms a transnational Caribbean ethnic identity. She argues that over the years, policy analyses addressing minority ethnic groups in the UK has used racial stereotypes to develop an understanding of family relationships in the black community.

One result of this ethnic stereotype is an assumption that Caribbean families have ‘weak’ social capital: low levels of participation in civil activities, low levels of voting, poor educational achievement and high levels of single-parent households and high levels of youth unemployment and crime. This is too simplistic an explanation for Reynolds, who argues strongly that a knowledge of cultural factors and structural constraints is vital to understanding the diverse ways in which different ethnic groups develop, sustain and access social capital. Her research considered thirty second- and third-generation Caribbean young people (aged between 16 and 30), primarily in London, but also in Birmingham, Manchester and Nottingham and fifty kinship/family members in Britain and the Caribbean (Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica). Reynolds (2006: 1093) argues that Caribbean families do have ‘strong’ social capital, as they demonstrate “strong social capital in racial-ethnic specific community events” and are much more likely to participate in these areas (e.g. Saturday schools, black church groups and Caribbean welfare-based organisations). For Reynolds, this strong ‘bonding’ social capital is a useful starting point in developing and understanding young peoples’ lives and their family social networks. This ‘bonding’ social capital is not confined to their local area or nation-state; on the contrary, ‘bonding’ social capital is understood within a transnational context which allows young Caribbean people to access and link into transnational social
resources and family activities. By using this social capital to establish cross-ethnic networks, relationships and bonding social capital within the transnational family, young Caribbean people reaffirm and develop a Caribbean cultural identity (Reynolds and Zontini, 2006). Within a society where young Caribbean people may feel excluded and marginalised, Reynolds believes that by participating in these transnational networks, young Caribbean people feel a sense of belonging and collective membership. As a result, some young Caribbean people carve out multiple ethnic identities.

Other researchers argue that there are limits to Caribbean transnationalism among first- and second-generation Caribbean groups in Britain. Layton-Henry (2003) suggests that transnationalism is not being sustained among second- and third-generation African-Caribbeans and that even among the first-generation transnationalism is not strong or sustained. Layton-Henry (2003) researched a core Birmingham sample of 35 participants all aged between 16-50 years. Twelve were born in the Caribbean, mainly Jamaica, whilst the remaining 23 participants were born in Britain, all aged between 16-50 years. He also interviewed a further 20 Caribbean men in group discussions. He uses Portes’ et al’s (1999) definition of a transnational community as involving a large part of the immigrant community in sustained contact and activity between the two countries over a period of time for the first- and second-generations in order to justify his explanation that “African-Caribbean people in Birmingham do not belong to a transnational community” (Layton-Henry, 2003: 19). He describes migration from the Caribbean to Britain from the 1940s onwards as effectively “internal rather than international” as “African-Caribbeans from the British West Indies were British subjects with a strong identification with Britain”. These African-Caribbeans arriving in Britain had citizenship rights on their arrival; thereby they were afforded formal and legal status. However, this British citizenship did not necessarily mean a warm welcome from the indigenous population; instead these Caribbean migrants were often met with “suspicion, fear, discrimination and racism” (Layton-Henry, 2003: 7). Furthermore, because of this discrimination, Caribbean migrants could have identified more strongly with the Caribbean by retaining dual nationalities and engaging in more transnational activities such as leading dual lives, living in two cultures and maintaining a living through regular
contact across national borders. Layton-Henry argues that for a number of reasons they did not maintain ‘physical and actual’ links but rather ‘emotional and sentimental’ links with the Caribbean. He proposes that the distance between Britain and the Caribbean and the cost of travel and the fact that the African-Caribbean community in Britain is not a wealthy one meant that transnational activities and links were hard to sustain and maintain. He also suggests that most of the British-born African-Caribbeans marry British partners, unlike other migrant communities who seek partners from their countries of origin. The 2001 Census showed that in Britain, 29 per cent of Black Caribbean men and 20 per cent of Black Caribbean women were in inter-ethnic marriages. For those of a South Asian background, the figures are significantly lower, with 6 per cent of Indians, 4 per cent of Pakistanis and 3 per cent of Bangladeshis in inter-ethnic marriages outside of their ethnic group (Office of National Statistics, 2001). Layton-Henry (2003) suggests that this growth of exogenous partnerships is a clear indication of the social integration of African-Caribbean people in the UK today.

CONCLUSION
It is evident that transnationalism still has the ability to divide, shape and inform the debate in respect of international migration, new immigrant identities and communities and migrants’ links to their countries of origin.

In the midst of the debate, one thing is clear: immigrants and their children can and do have multiple identities. Whilst not all second-generation people will have multiple identities or identify with their parents’ country of origin, there are a significant number who are transnational, or who at the very least, engage in some transnational activity. Though it is small and unrepresentative at the moment, the existing empirical base on second-generation return, such as second-generation Greek-American return (Christou, 2006), and second-generation Swiss-Italian return (Wessendorf, 2007), supports the claim that transnational practices commonly occur among the second-generation, though the influence and consequent behavioural impacts of these practices are by no means proven. This seems to undermine Kivisto’s (2001) argument that
transnationalism is a first-generation phenomenon that disappears with the second- and third-generations. Although transnationalism is not without its critics and doubters (Kivisto, 2001; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004) it still holds an important place in the understanding of contemporary migration and it goes a long way in furthering the understanding of 1.5-, second- and third-generation individuals and their position and experiences in a globalised world.

As Reynold’s (2006) research on the British-born second-generation community has shown, transnational practices and transnationalism remain strong for some sections of the second-generation Caribbean community. Potter’s (2001 and 2005a) research on second-generation ‘return’ migration to the Caribbean again demonstrates that for a cohort of people, ties to the ancestral homeland are alive and strong. In some instances these young and professional second-generation British-born Caribbeans, along side American Afro-Caribbeans and Canadian-Caribbean second-generation returned migrants are “making a difference back home” due to their accumulated stock of social and human capital, as recently indicated by Potter and Conway (2008).

Notwithstanding the considerable body of literature on the first-generation Caribbean community and in recent times, research on the second-generation Caribbean community, return migration and Caribbean social capital, it is amply evident that there is scope for more work on the Caribbean second- and third-generation community in situ. Major foci are life-worlds in the context of Caribbean transnational experiences and practices in situ, inter-generational transfers of transnational practices, multiple identities, family migration patterns, views of the ancestral homeland, and life-course transitions. All will contribute worthwhile insights concerning contemporary Caribbean transnationalism and the resultant multi-local diaspora it fosters.
FOOTNOTES
1 The term life-cycle viewed life as separate stages which every individual must pass through. The term life-course has succeeded the term life-cycle as it is seen to be more useful when describing changes that may not be contiguous with changes in the phases of life.

REFERENCES


http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article801990 (January 24th 2008).


