Volume 10 Number 3 1997
After the Demise of Empiricism: the problem of judging social and educational inquiry, John K. Smith, 1993, Norwood NJ, Ablex, 179pp, $39.95 cloth.
In this book John K. Smith builds on the arguments he developed in his earlier volume, The Nature of Social and Educational Inquiry (Smith 1989). The focus here is rather more specific than before, being limited to the 'criteria' by which inquiry and its products are to be judged. However, this particular issue is a crucial one for social scientists, from most points of view; and, as Smith shows, it is one that is highly problematic and subject to considerable debate. Indeed, it raises deep questions about the rationale for and practice of social and educational research.
The author contextualises the problem by examining 'the demise of empiricism', sketching the component beliefs of that point of view, as found in the social sciences, and the arguments against them. He then looks at three attempts to deal with the problem of criteria in the wake of empiricism's demise: postempiricism, critical theory, and interpretivism. In each case he outlines the position and what it implies for the assessment of research. One of the interesting features of the book is that he does this in terms of hermeneutics, ascribing a different version to each paradigm: validation hermeneutics to postempiricism, critical hermeneutics to critical theory, and philosophical hermeneutics to interpretivism.
For the most part the book is concerned simply with spelling out these different views and the arguments surrounding them. However, as with his earlier volume, Smith's commitment to interpretivism shapes the discussion. It is striking, for example, that, in his summary at the beginning of the book, discussion of the chapters on postempiricism and critical theory centres on the problems they face, but that this is not the case with the chapter on interpretivism (pp.20-1). Nor is this an inaccurate representation of the chapters themselves: they too display an interpretivist slant. Moreover, it would seem to follow from Smith's version of interpretivism, that this is unavoidable; though this is not something that he emphasises.
It is also significant that the discussion of empiricism and its successors is framed in terms of a linear scale, along which postempiricism and critical theory are portrayed as moving some way from empiricism, but not as far as interpretivism. The implication of this seems to be that only the latter is sufficiently radical as a solution to the problems that empiricism raises. Indeed, this conclusion is made explicit at the end of the book, albeit in a tentative manner.
The use of this radicalism scale, as a way of organising the discussion, contrasts interestingly with the way in which much the same three paradigms have been treated by other commentators. One of the most popular of these is a dialectical model, whereby critical research is presented as transcending the contradictions between empiricism and interpretive approaches (see, for example, Fay 1975 and Outhwaite 1975). This, of course, has the rhetorical effect of promoting the critical paradigm. Smith's rhetorical scheme is a useful counter to this, but it is no more satisfactory. Both approaches obscure presuppositions that are a matter of dispute, and can therefore be misleading. For example, there is a temporal aspect to the scale of epistemological radicalism that Smith uses, which is at odds with historical accuracy. One could get the impression that, until recently, empiricism was dominant and that critical theory and interpretivism are developments that arose subsequent to its demise. Yet, the debate between positivism and interpretivism has been taking place since the mid-nineteenth century. Similarly, critical theory comes out of Marxism, as Smith recognises. Moreover, many of the criticisms of empiricism, that Smith discusses, have quite a long history, going back for example at least to Peirce and Duhem. And the arguments that he uses in support of interpretivism come from the Greek sceptics. It is not that Smith is unaware of all this, but the rhetorical scheme he uses to relate the three paradigms could mislead readers who are less well informed about the history of philosophy and social science.
There is a more fundamental problem with the radicalism scale as well. It implies that postempiricism shares much with empiricism, whereas interpretivism has nothing in common with it. Smith presents postempiricism and critical theory as trying to find a via media between empiricism and relativism, but as necessarily failing. Rhetorically, this failure seems to follow automatically from the radicalism scale, and to imply the necessary adoption of interpretivism. But this is only the case if one retains the empiricist definition of knowledge, and interpretivism itself relies on this in order to deny the possibility of universal knowledge. By contrast, what is distinctive about postempiricism is its rejection of this foundationalist conception of knowledge, in favour of a fallibilist one, in terms of which universally valid knowledge is still possible. Postempiricism does not claim the availability of absolutely certain knowledge, nor does it insist that there are algorithmic criteria by which the validity of claims to knowledge can be judged. Smith recognises this in his chapter on postempiricism, but by the time he has reached his final chapter, this has been forgotten and he treats interpretivism as distinctive in denying the possibility of algorithmic criteria. In this way the cogency of postempiricism is obscured .
Having used the empiricist concept of knowledge as a basis for showing that universal knowledge is impossible, Smith's interpretivism then redefines 'knowledge' in non-empiricist and non-universal terms. Here, what is knowledge is determined by what is taken to be knowledge within a particular epistemic community. In this way there can be multiple, incompatible truths across communities. There are several problems with this. It is presented as not needing any epistemological warrant, and yet it is difficult to see how Smith can avoid assuming one. Also, the assumption that there are clearly distinguishable and internally homogeneous epistemic communities is questionable. It is important to note, too, that when ordinary people use the word 'truth' they do not usually mean 'what we all agree on', so that interpretivism here involves an implicit critique of the assumptions that currently shape our everyday thinking and action. Finally, there is the problem of relativism. Smith recognises this, but argues that it is only a problem from the point of view of empiricism and of those paradigms that have not completely shaken off its influence. However, this seems analogous to my claiming that tone-deafness is not a problem for my singing, it is only a problem for those people who are wedded to an outmoded commitment to musical pitch. And it is striking that, like many relativists, Smith does not seem to act on the basis of his convictions. He argues against the idea implicit in validation hermeneutics, that there is an intended meaning behind communications, which we ought to try to capture. Yet, throughout the book, and commendably, from my point of view, he sets about trying to understand the arguments of empiricists, postempiricists, and critical researchers, in their own terms, as well as those of the authors whom he takes to represent interpretivism. What this demonstrates is the well-known fact that relativism involves a pragmatic contradiction.
It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy between the kind of inquiry Smith's interpretivism recommends and the work of many of those who would see themselves as interpretive sociologists. In this respect, Smith's discussion is similar to those of critical theorists influenced by Habermas, like Fay and Outhwaite. Smith argues that interpretive inquiry must have, at its core, interpretation of the reasons, motivations and intentions of the people being studied, so that 'social and educational inquirers are interpreters of the interpretations people give to their own actions and their interactions with others' (p 19) This is certainly a central element of most interpretive approaches, but it does not exhaust what is usually involved. Equally important, generally speaking, is the description of social interaction itself, the identification of discrepancies between perspectives and behaviour, the penetration of 'fronts' etc. And Smith's version of interpretivism also seems to discourage recognition of unintentional, or at least unrecognised, consequences of action, along with attention to the ways in which people's interpretations are shaped by their environments. Of course, there are arguments in favour of adopting a narrow definition of interpretive sociology. There is an obvious parallel here with ethnomethodology, but there are also important differences. An exploration of these might have been fruitful.
The treatment of interpretivism is also rather narrow in philosophical terms. Thus, little or no use is made of phenomenological work - for example the writings of Schutz, of poststructuralism, or of the 'linguistic philosophy' of Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin. Neglect of the last of these, in particular, leads to weaknesses, in my view; notably in the treatment of human action as resulting from reasons and motives (p.18). The issue of whether the latter are accounting resources, rather than subjective factors which somehow generate behaviour, is neglected. There is also the question of whether interpreting the intentions of others does not itself raise all the same epistemological issues as assessing whether people's interpretations match reality. Finally, questions can be raised about the differences among the writers that Smith draws on to specify the content of interpretivism: Gadamer, Rorty and Feyerabend. They are by no means all of a piece. However, addressing these matters would have led to a much more demanding text.
This is a useful book, then. It provides a relatively accessible discussion of a key issue in social and educational research, one which goes to the heart of the most fundamental disagreements that currently plague the area. It introduces the reader to some influential philosophical arguments and explores their application to research methodology. Overall, the discussion is accurate and accessible, though the chapter on critical theory is rather weak. At the same time, for reasons I have explained, I believe a rather misleading impression is given of the relationships among the three paradigms discussed, and of that between interpretivism (as Smith defines it) and the sociological research usually categorised under this heading.
References
Fay, B., 1975, Social Theory and Practice, London, Allen and Unwin.
Outhwaite, W., 1975, Understanding Social Life, London, Allen and Unwin.
Smith, J. K., 1989, The Nature of Social and Educational Inquiry, Norwood, NJ, Ablex.
Martyn Hammersley
The Open University
